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ABSTRACT
Tax law classifies business arrangements as one of three general structures:
(1) disregarded arrangements, (2) tax partnerships, or (3) tax corporations.
Since the enactment of the income tax in 1913, tax law has struggled unsuccess-
fully to develop an ideal model for classifying business arrangements. The cur-
rent model's sole virtue is its simplicity, derived from formalistic, elective
attributes. Its greatest shortcoming may be that it disregards the reasons par-
ties form business arrangements and the reasons they use economic items to re-
duce rent-seeking behavior and agency costs. That disregard often allows busi-
ness participants to choose their tax classification and minimize their taxes,
which erodes the tax base and shifts tax burdens to others but does not alter the
parties' economic relationships. This Article rejects the current model and
presents a classification model based on the economic theory of the firm. Eco-
nomic theory aids classification in three respects. First, it helps explain why
parties form business arrangements. Second, it views business arrangements as
nexuses of contracts composed of various parties. This view helps identify the
economic aspects of business arrangements and the economic rights of business
participants, irrespective of legal form. Third, economic theory demonstrates
that residual risk (the right to the residual assets of a business) measures the
economic interests parties have in business arrangements. In particular, resi-
dual risk helps distinguish between arrangements that can trace income from
its source to the owner of the source, or from allocations to the beneficiaries of
those allocations, and those that cannot. That knowledge clarifies the appro-
priate tax regime for all arrangements and leads to the residual-risk model for
classifying business arrangements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Properly classifying business arrangements is essential to pre-
serving the integrity of the income tax system. The income tax sys-
tem uses various tax regimes, including partnership tax and corpo-
rate tax, to tax business participants. The application of those tax re-
gimes depends upon an arrangement's classification as either a tax
partnership or tax corporation. If the classification model does not
properly match a business arrangement with a tax regime, members
of the arrangement may receive the economic benefit from the ar-
rangement without shouldering the corresponding tax burden. That
result occurs when the classification model fails to consider the eco-
nomic attributes of an arrangement. The current classification model
fails to consider relevant economic aspects of business arrangements
and undermines Congressional efforts to enact income tax laws that
achieve specific tax policy objectives.1 Economic theory, on the other
1. Commentators generally agree on fundamental policy criteria such as equity, effi-
ciency, simplicity, and administrability. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 143, 146-47 (1992) (analyzing the equity and efficiency of certain recove-
ries for injuries); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV.
807, 816, 829-30, 848-49 (2005) (evaluating transfer taxes using the principles of equity,
efficiency, and simplicity); Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17
STAN. L. REV. 567, 568, 569-72, 586-90 (1965) (arguing that a tax system should, among
other things, supply adequate revenue, impose equal taxes, and avoid impairment of the
market-oriented economy (i.e., promote efficiency)). Commentators may not, however,
agree on the best system to achieve such policies. For example, they may disagree on the
concept of income-some commentators believe consumption is the best concept of income
while others believe a broader definition is more important. See, e.g., William D. Andrews,
A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113, 1188
(1974) (arguing that a cash flow tax is the ideal income tax); Joseph Bankman & David A.
Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2006) (arguing in favor of a consumption definition of income);
Alan Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370, 400 (1979) (arguing that
the income tax has worked well and that the cost of changing to another system would be
too costly); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89
YALE L. J. 1081, 1082 (1980) (arguing that consumption tax unfairly excludes a significant
portion of wealth from the tax base); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 931-32 (1975) (criticizing
Professor William D. Andrews's argument in favor of a consumption tax). Although such
concepts are crucial to a just tax system, the discussion of classifying business arrange-
ments does not have to consider which decision is preferable. Instead, this Article argues
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hand, provides residual risk (the right to the residual assets of a
business) as a method for measuring parties' economic interests in
business arrangements. As a measure of economic interest, residual
risk should dictate the tax regime that applies to the various types of
business arrangements, and it should order their classification.
Two examples illustrate the deficiencies of the current classifica-
tion model. First, the current model allows parties to alter the cha-
racter of the arrangement's income. The income tax system imposes a
tax rate structure on income earned as compensation for services
(which can be as high as thirty-five percent)2 and a separate rate
structure on gains from the sale of certain capital assets (which gen-
erally will not exceed fifteen percent).3 Traditionally, employment
contracts memorialize service arrangements, and payments made to
the service provider pursuant to such contracts should be compensa-
tion for services. Parties may, however, create an economically
equivalent arrangement using a limited liability company or limited
partnership.4 The current model disregards an arrangement memo-
rialized by an employment contract, but it most likely treats the
same arrangement as a tax partnership if memorialized by a part-
nership or limited liability company agreement.5 That different clas-
sification may affect the character of income a service provider re-
ports on a tax return. Income a partnership allocates to a service-
providing partner could be long-term capital gains taxed at favorable
rates, while amounts paid under an employment contract would be
compensation taxed at higher rates. Thus, the current model allows
business participants to alter the character of income by changing
the form, but not the substance of a transaction. That ability under-
that classifications should help preserve the general tax system by creating definitions
that help ensure that tax items follow economic items.
2. See I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (2006) (setting the maximum individual tax rate at thirty-five
percent for tax years beginning in 2003).
3. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (2006) (imposing a tax on individuals and providing the gen-
eral graduated rate structures for individual tax liability); I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2006) (pro-
viding preferential rates for adjusted net capital gain).
4. See Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 TAX NOTES
743, 746-52 (2009) (demonstrating that investment advisors use entity structures to convert the
character of income without altering the economic aspects of an employment arrangement).
5. See David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94
VA. L. REv. 715, 731-33 (2008) (concluding with thinly-constructed analysis that such ar-
rangements are tax partnerships and the partners act in a partnership capacity). But see
Bradley T. Borden, Profits-Only Partnership Interests, 74 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming
2009), available at http://ssrn.conabstract=1262493 (arguing that such arrangements
should not be tax partnerships, or the service providers should be treated as nonpartners);
Douglas L. Longhofer, The Lost Regulations: Section 707 and the Definition of Partner Ca-
pacity 11 Bus. ENT. 16, 26-29 (2009) (suggesting that a more rigorous analysis is needed to
determine if service-providing partners act in partner capacity).
6. See Polsky, supra note 4, at 752-62 (describing the manager's tax goal in fee conver-
sions and suggesting the proper tax treatment should be to disallow favorable tax treatment).
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mines any income tax law and policy that supports the different tax
rates.
Second, the current model allows business participants to skirt
the assignment of income doctrine. The assignment of income doc-
trine provides generally that a person who realizes an economic bene-
fit must report the corresponding tax item on a tax return. 7 Conse-
quently, a person who receives compensation for providing services
must report compensation income on a tax return.8 A person who rea-
lizes economic gain on the disposition of property must report a cor-
responding tax gain.9 The current model allows parties to shift the
incidence of taxation by contributing property or services to an ar-
rangement classified as a tax partnership or tax corporation. 10 Thus,
the current model frustrates the assignment of income doctrine. 1 The
shortcomings of the current model exist because the model developed
independent of economic theory.
Section II of this Article traces the evolution of the current classi-
fication model, revealing three significant points. First, the model
undergoes significant changes every few decades. 12 Second, the model
7. See Brant J. Hellwig, The Supreme Court's Casual Use of the Assignment of In-
come Doctrine, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 765-81 (2006) (discussing the assignment of in-
come doctrine generally but arguing that it should apply only to gratuitous assignments of
income); Stanley S. Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Tax-
able Person, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 796-815 (1933) (discussing the application of the as-
signment of income doctrine in various contexts).
8. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930) (holding that a husband could not
shift the tax liability of his compensation to his wife).
9. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1940) (holding that the person who
owns property must recognize income from that property).
10. See Bradley T. Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internalization of
Tax-Item Transactions, 59 S.C. L. REV. 297, 333-45 (2008) (demonstrating how partners
may use the partnership allocation rules to separate the incidence of taxation from the
economic items allocated to partners).
11. Another example is illustrative. If corporate marginal tax rates are lower than in-
dividual marginal tax rates, individuals, particularly high-income individuals, may be able
to shelter some income from higher tax rates by using a tax corporation for income-
producing functions. See John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax
Entities Universe: "Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do," 78 TEX. L. REV.
885, 903-22 (2000) (discussing the use of entities taxed as corporations to shelter some in-
come from higher taxes). Parties will also structure ownership arrangements as open te-
nancies in common, which the IRS may not classify as tax partnerships, to obtain section
1031 nonrecognition. See generally Bradley T. Borden, Open Tenancies-in-Common, 39
SETON HALL L. REV. 387 (2009) (describing and analyzing a safe harbor provided by the
IRS for parties seeking to avoid tax partnership classification).
12. The classification model originated in 1909 with the enactment of the 1909 Corpo-
rate Excise Tax and the Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178,
185-87 (1911), which held that the definition of tax corporation depended upon whether
the arrangement was organized under state law (adopting the grant theory). See infra text
accompanying notes 65-71. The combination of the enactment of the corporate income tax
in 1913 and the 1918 statutory definition of tax corporation that included associations led
to the corporate resemblance test of tax corporation as expressed in 1934 regulations and
the Supreme Court's 1935 decision in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935)
(adopting the entity theory). See infra text accompanying notes 72-83. The 1954 Ninth
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lags behind development of legal and economic theory, sometimes
adopting concepts decades after they have lost relevance in other
areas of the law. 13 Third, the model lacks tax policy support. As the
current model passes its ten-year anniversary, commentators have
begun recognizing chinks in its armor, calling for changes or further
examination of the model. 14 Furthermore, changing business practic-
es mandate periodic reviews of established legal and tax rules, and
the current economic climate compels a review of the current model
for classifying tax entities. Finally, developments in economic theory
shed new light on the analysis of the classification model.
A review of the current model reveals that it is wanting in many
respects. For instance, it relies upon legal formalities, labels, and
elections to classify business arrangements, enabling business partic-
ipants to privately influence the placement of the incidence of taxa-
tion.1 5 For example, if partnership tax law allows untaxed assign-
ments of tax items,1 6 business people may elect tax partnership clas-
sification to exploit the allocation rules and use tax items as consid-
eration.1 7 Additionally, if entity tax law does not concern itself with
Circuit decision in United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 421-24 (9th Cir. 1954) led to the
promulgation of the Kintner Regulations in 1960, which adopted a bright-line multi-factor
test for determining whether an arrangement was a tax corporation. See infra text accom-
panying notes 84-97. In 1977, Wyoming enacted the first limited liability company statute,
and the IRS privately ruled in 1980 that such an entity could be a tax partnership, creat-
ing a de facto classification election. See infra text accompanying notes 101-06. Finally, in
1997, Treasury created the current model by promulgating the check-the-box regulations,
which formalized and simplified the classification election (abandoning theory for the sake
of simplicity). See infra text accompanying notes 107-13. Thus, the important dates in the
evolution of the classification model are 1909-11, 1913-18, 1934-35, 1954-60, 1977-80,
and 1997. Significant changes, therefore, appear to occur every fifteen to twenty years,
suggesting another major change may occur over the next three to seven years.
13. Corporate law's concept of corporations evolved from the original grant/concession
theory (accepted in the nineteenth century), which recognized that states granted corpora-
tions the privilege of existence, to the entity theory, which recognized corporations as enti-
ties separate from their owners (well established by the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury). See infra text accompanying notes 48-55, 56-60. The entity theory is now being
eroded by the economic view of corporations as nexuses of contracts. See infra text accom-
panying notes 142-45.
14. See, e.g., Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-
Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 406, 457-58
(2005) (concluding that the current classification model adds attractive complexity to the
tax system and results in tax deregulation); Heather M. Field, Checking in on "Check-the-
Box," 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451 (2009) (suggesting that twelve years after the promulgation
of the check-the-box classification regulations, the time is ripe for reconsidering them).
15. This Article uses the term "incidence of taxation" to refer to the obligation to pay
tax, or the statutory incidence of taxation. See HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC
FINANCE 304-29 (8th ed. 2008) (discussing tax shifting that occurs when the economic in-
cidence of taxation differs from the statutory incidence of taxation).
16. This Article uses the term "tax items" to describe items that factor into the com-
putation of taxable income. They include items of income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit.
See I.R.C. § 704 (2006) (providing for the allocation of tax items).
17. See Borden, supra note 10, at 338-46 (demonstrating how taxpayers may use the
partnership tax allocation rules to engage in tax-item transactions).
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the accurate allocation of tax items, parties may elect corporate form
and shift the incidence of taxation. 18 The review also demonstrates
that the current model fails to justify the various tax regimes. The
model does not explain why entity tax is important or why tax law
imposes a double tax on distributions from arrangements subject to
entity taxation. The current model also fails to contemplate why tax
law needs aggregate-plus taxation. Those failures make classification
arbitrary and the application of the tax regimes inconsistent. Thus,
the shortcomings of the current model threaten the integrity of the
tax system.
This Article accepts as a premise of entity classification that clas-
sifying business arrangements should help ensure that tax items fol-
low economic items. That premise requires a person who realizes an
economic benefit from providing services or owning property to report
a corresponding tax item on a tax return. If tax items follow economic
items, participants in business arrangements would not be able to al-
ter the character of income, delay the recognition of income, or oth-
erwise shift the tax burden using the classification rules. Such re-
sults help promote the accurate placement of the tax burden, which
in turn promotes both equity and efficiency-two linchpins of tax pol-
icy. 19 To ensure that tax items follow economic items, the classifica-
tion model should adopt a metric that accurately measures business
participants' economic interests.
Section III suggests that the economic concept of residual risk
(rights to the residual assets of a business) is such a metric and
demonstrates how it measures economic interests. Residual risk is
an important component of the neoclassical theory of the firm, a
theory that ignores the legal form of business arrangements and
18. For example, a person with property that has significant built-in gain (i.e., the
value of the property exceeds the property's tax basis) may contribute such property to an
entity taxed as a corporation with at least one other member. If the corporation later sells
the property and pays tax on the property, the noncontributing shareholder bears a portion
of the incidence of tax on the built-in gain, which should have been borne solely by the con-
tributing shareholder who held the property while the built-in gain accrued. See I.R.C. §
362(a) (2006) (providing that a corporation takes a shareholder's basis in contributed prop-
erty if the contribution is tax free). Partnership tax law recognizes this potentiality and
helps ensure that the contributing partner bears the incidence of tax on the built-in gain to
the extent reasonably possible. See I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
3(a)(1) (as amended in 2005).
19. See, e.g., Sneed, supra note 1, at 574-80; Edwin Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395 (1987) (using equity and efficiency to
analyze the 1986 Act). Vertical equity, or distributive justice, is another important aspect
of tax policy. Sneed, supra note 1, at 581-86. Accuracy is important to vertical equity be-
cause it identifies the different economic situations of different taxpayers. Vertical equity
is less relevant to tax entity classification because once income is accurately determined,
the appropriate distribution of the tax "is a matter of social taste and political debate." Ri-
chard A- Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 113 (1990).
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views them as nexuses of contracts. 20 That theory considers the rights
and obligations of management, bearers of residual risk, and other
market participants.21 It also helps explain why parties form ar-
rangements and how they use economic items to influence behavior.
Because tax law has traditionally drawn significantly from economic
theory, its disregard of the economic theory of the firm in tax entity
classification is unusual.
22
This Article introduces three types of residual risk that help
measure business participants' economic interests: (1) unitary resi-
dual risk, (2) allocation-dependent residual risk, and (3) distribution-
dependent risk. These various types of residual risk help classify
business arrangements and determine the appropriate tax regime for
each type of business arrangement. This Article demonstrates that
members of arrangements with unitary residual risk can trace eco-
nomic items such as income and loss directly from the resources they
control. The tax regime that naturally fits such arrangements is ag-
gregate taxation. Members of arrangements with allocation-
dependent residual risk cannot trace economic items directly from
controlled resources. They may, however, trace economic items from
privately ordered allocations that have independent economic signi-
ficance. Aggregate-plus taxation is the natural fit for such arrange-
ments. Finally, members of arrangements with distribution-
dependent residual risk cannot trace economic items directly from
20. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (using the
term "firm" to refer to a "legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships").
21. See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.
L. & ECON. 375, 377 (1983) ('CThe chief mission of neoclassical economics is to understand
how the price system coordinates the use of resources, not to understand the inner work-
ings of real firms."); Oliver E. Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and
Corporate Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 351, 357 (1983) ("The corporation, after all, is one
member of a family of complex organizations, a common theory of which applies to all. Spe-
cificaly, the same principles of hierarchical decomposition apply to every member of the
set."). Legal scholars use economic principles to understand business law generally and to
explain its developments and the evolution of legal forms of entities. See, e.g., FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991) (explaining the structure of corporate law from an economic perspective); Henry
Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1335 (2006) (providing a
detailed analysis of the evolution of the various legal forms of business entities available to
business owners today).
22. Much of the early scholarly work on taxation and income tax came from econo-
mists. See, e.g., A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE (1929); DAVID RICARDO,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (Prometheus Books 1996) (1911);
EDWIN ROBERT ANDERSON SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX (1911); HENRY C. SIMONS,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY
(1938). This Article uses the term "tax law" to refer specifically to income tax law. The im-
portance of entity taxation extends beyond income tax law, but the analysis of all aspects
of tax law would be too unwieldy for this project. Future work should consider whether the
proposed model works for other areas of the law.
20101
252 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
controlled resources or from privately ordered allocations. Thus, such
arrangements are the natural subject of entity taxation.
Section IV draws from the analysis of the different types of resi-
dual risk and the matching tax regimes to create the residual-risk
model for classifying business arrangements. The residual-risk model
adopts the nexus of contract view of business arrangements and
moves away from legal forms and elective regimes. By focusing on
the economic rights of business participants, the residual-risk model
will help ensure that tax items follow economic items and help elimi-
nate the private ordering of the incidence of taxation. Its reliance on
economic principles helps reduce inaccuracies, inequity, and ineffi-
ciency and helps the classification of business arrangements more
closely mirror current economic theory.
II. CURRENT CLASSIFICATION MODEL
Tax law currently has three general tax regimes-aggregate taxa-
tion, aggregate-plus taxation, and entity taxation. The tax regimes
are complex, but a few words describe each sufficiently to frame the
discussion of how to classify business arrangements. Entity taxation
recognizes entities separate from their members and imposes a tax at
the entity level.2 Thus, arrangements subject to entity taxation re-
port income and pay an income tax.24 Entity taxation applies to tax
corporations. Aggregate taxation completely disregards a business
arrangement and taxes each member of the arrangement separately
on income from the arrangement's property or services. 25 Aggregate
taxation applies to disregarded arrangements. Aggregate-plus taxa-
tion disregards arrangements to the extent possible, but it adds enti-
ty tax components as needed to address the economic aspects and
administrative needs of such arrangements.26 Arrangements subject
23. Under the current tax system, owners of tax corporations are subject to double
taxation-tax at the entity level and tax on distributions. See I.R.C. § 11(a) (2006) (impos-
ing a tax on corporations); I.R.C. § 301(c) (2006) (including distributions and dividends in
gross income). Entity taxation does not, however, require double taxation. See DEPT OF THE
TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992), availa-
ble at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/ibrary/integration-paper/integration.pdf
[hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]; Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income
Tax, 2007 TAx NOTES TODAY 114-42 (June 13, 2007) (recommending that corporate tax
system be modified to tax corporate income only once). This Article focuses on the policy
reasons for entity tax and for the most part leaves the debate over double taxation for a dif-
ferent venue. Nonetheless, to accurately place the incidence of taxation, the law may need
to modify the rate structure of taxes on dividends or eliminate the tax.
24. See I.R.C. §11(a) (2006) (imposing a tax on corporations).
25. See, e.g., Hahn v. Comm'r, 22 T.C. 212, 214 (1954) (holding that members of a tenancy
in common have income from the property equal to their ownership interests in the property).
26. See Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxation, 43 GA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=1121351 (describing the
history, theory, and policy justification for aggregate-plus taxation).
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to aggregate-plus taxation file information returns but do not pay
tax.27 Instead, the members of such arrangements pay tax on their al-
locable share of the arrangement's income. 28 Aggregate-plus taxation
applies to tax partnerships. The current entity classification model
also includes S corporations, which are qualified closely-held corpora-
tions.29 Originally, such arrangements were subject to entity taxa-
tion, but Congress realized that S corporations should not pay an ent-
ity tax because the entity subjected closely-held corporations to a tax
that did not apply to partnerships, which were generally closely
held. 0 Therefore, Congress removed certain components from entity
taxation to allow tax items to flow from the arrangement to the
members, who pay taxes on such items.31 The removal of entity com-
ponents created entity-minus taxation.
Finally, the current classification model includes qualified tax
partnerships. Qualified tax partnerships are arrangements that come
within the definition of a tax partnership but elect out of partnership
taxation.3 2 Such arrangements include investment partnerships and
joint-production partnerships. 33 Even though qualified tax partner-
ships are not subject to partnership tax rules, other provisions of the
tax law may recognize them as tax partnerships. 34 Thus, they are not
subject to pure aggregate taxation. Instead, they are subject to a mild
form of aggregate-plus taxation. Figure 1 represents the current
model for classifying business arrangements. 35
27. See I.R.C. § 701 (2006) (providing that partnerships are not subject to tax); Treas.
Reg. § 1.6031(a)-l(a) (as amended in 2005) (requiring partnerships to file returns).
28. See I.R.C. § 701 (2006) (providing that partners are liable in their individual ca-
pacities for tax on income of a partnership).
29. See I.R.C. § 1361(a) (2006) (providing that an S corporation is an electing small
business corporation); I.R.C. § 1361(b) (2006) (defining small business corporation to in-
clude only closely held corporations).
30. See S. REP. NO. 85-1983, at 87 (1958) (providing that subchapter S benefits small
corporations by removing the double tax).
31. See Jerald David August, Benefits and Burdens of Subchapter S in a Check-the-
Box World, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 287, 322-30 (1999) (discussing the history of S corporations).
32. See generally I.R.C. § 761(a) (2006).
33. See I.R.C. § 761(a)(1) (2006) (providing an election for tax partnerships availed of
for investment purposes); I.R.C. § 761(a)(2) (2006) (providing an election for certain tax
partnerships availed of for joint production of services or property).
34. See Bryant v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 848, 864 (1966) ("The partnership remains intact
and other sections of the Code are applicable as if no exclusion existed.!).
35. A more complete model would also include arrangements such as real estate in-
vestment trusts and foreign entities. For the sake of introducing the residual-risk model,
this Article focuses only on those arrangements identified in Figure 1. Future work should
consider the model that classifies other arrangements. See Bradley T. Borden, Policy and
Theoretical Dimensions of Qualified Tax Partnerships, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (2008)
(introducing the tax entity classification spectrum).
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Figure 1
Current Model for Classifying Business Arrangements
Electing Investment
and Joint-Production Electing Qualifying
Partnerships Small Businesses
Disregarded Qualified Tax Tax Partner- S Corpora- C Corpora-
Arrangements Partnerships ships tions tions
Aggregate Mild Aggregate- Aggregate-Plus Entity-Minus Entity
Taxation Plus Taxation Taxation Taxation Taxation
Definition of Tax State Law Corporation or
Partnership Check-the-Box Election
Figure 1 depicts the current classification model as a continuum. Tax
law moves from aggregate taxation by degrees to entity taxation. The
arrangements move concurrently from disregarded to entity status. As
Figure 1 depicts, the definition of tax partnership separates disregarded
arrangements from tax partnerships. The line separating tax partner-
ships from tax corporations (S corporations and C corporations 36) is a
state law classification or a check-the-box election.3 7 Qualified tax part-
nerships and S corporations are subsets of tax partnerships and tax cor-
porations, respectively. The figure also depicts how the various tax re-
gimes track the classification of business arrangements.
The following Section reveals the origin and evolution of the cur-
rent model. The discussion demonstrates that tax law has lagged be-
hind legal and economic theories and fails to match tax regimes with
relevant economic and legal concepts of business arrangements.
A. Grant Theory and Corporate Resemblance
The origin and evolution of business arrangements sets the stage
for discussing tax classifications. The natural form of business entity
is the partnership, originating thousands of years ago.3 8 A typical an-
36. A C corporation is a tax entity subject to the entity tax provision in subchapter C
of the Internal Revenue Code (Corporate Distributions and Adjustments). See 26 U.S.C. §§
301-385 (2006).
37. The modern classification model actually includes within the definition of "tax
corporation" other state-created and foreign entities. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as
amended in 2008). To simplify the discussion, this Article uses "state law corporation" to
refer to all of the arrangements listed in the definition.
38. See generally ABRAHAM L. UDOVITCH, PARTNERSHIP AND PROFIT IN MEDIEVAL
ISLAM (1970) (discussing medieval Islamic partnerships); Borden, supra note 26; Hans-
mann et al., supra note 21, at 1356-61 (tracing partnerships to ancient Rome); Henry Fr.
Lutz, Babylonian Partnerships, 4 J. EcON. & BUS. HIST. 555, 557-59 (1932) (tracing part-
nerships to the first recorded private business enterprises in ancient Babylon during the
Hammurabi period (2057 to 1758 B.C.)).
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cient merchant partnership divided investment and management
among the partners.39 Such arrangements were attractive because
investors, who exercised no control over the operations of the ar-
rangement, were liable only to the extent of their invested capital.40
Managers, on the other hand, brought little if any capital to the ar-
rangement but bore liability for losses incurred due to their mana-
gerial shortcomings.41 Such arrangements usually lasted only a short
period-generally the duration of a single venture.42 The short dura-
tion and immediate settling of accounts provided liquidity for the in-
vestor.43 The investor's creditors could not disrupt the venture be-
cause the manager was often isolated from the creditors of the inves-
tor, providing the arrangement with a weak form of entity shiel-
ding.44 In a simple economy with relatively small ventures, such un-
sophisticated short-term arrangements were suitable. In other ar-
rangements, the investors had the right to withdraw capital, recoup-
ing their investments and any rightful returns on the investment.45
Such arrangements also provided liquidity to the investors.
The evolution of business made simple arrangements inadequate
for large-scale ventures. The longer distances traveled meant that
investors had to wait longer for ventures to complete prescribed ac-
tivities. Frequent asset liquidations were cumbersome and ineffi-
cient, and the right to withdraw would threaten the longevity and
success of larger ventures .46 Financially and geographically larger en-
terprises needed greater sums of capital but also needed to provide
investors with liquidity and limited liability.47 Tools that provided
limited liability, liquidity, and entity shielding in simpler arrange-
ments in a simpler economy became insufficient. Without preferred
features in place, the cost of capital would have become prohibitive.
The law reacted to the economic needs of larger enterprises by creat-
39. Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1360-61 (describing the Roman societas publi-
canorum, which included investors who exercised control and those who lacked control),
1372-74 (describing the medieval Italian commenda, which "had two partners: a passive
investor who provided capital, and a traveling trader (often the ship captain) who contri-
buted labor and initiative").
40. See Lutz, supra note 38, at 559.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 566.
43. See Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1376-77 (explaining that tradable interests
were necessary for entities with perpetual existence to provide investors with liquidity).
44. See id. at 1368, 1372-73 (noting that the manager's liability for shortfalls also dis-
couraged distributions, providing another form of entity shielding). "[Elntity shielding refers
to rules that protect a firm's assets from the personal creditors of its owners." Id. at 1337.
45. See id. at 1388-91.
46. See id. at 1376.
47. See id. at 1376-79.
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ing state-chartered, publicly traded joint stock companies as early as
the fourteenth century.48
Joint stock companies granted investors the right to sell their in-
terests in the company without the consent of other owners, satisfy-
ing the investors' need for liquidity.49 Investors in joint stock compa-
nies also enjoyed limited liability, and the law provided entity shiel-
ding.50 Such features made the cost of capital affordable and facili-
tated the growth of private business enterprises. The state's creation
of early joint stock companies provided the company a monopoly to
trade in a particular area, operate a particular asset, or perform
some other specific function.5 The monopolies allowed businesses to
grow financially and geographically.
The monopolistic nature of joint stock companies carried over to
early corporations chartered in the colonies and later in the United
States." Through the early nineteenth century, states granted corpo-
rate monopolies for quasi-governmental functions, such as operating
canals, building roads, and providing financial services. 3 From the
grant of such monopolies emerged the "grant" or "concession" theory
of corporations, which considered state law incorporation a grant or
privilege for the pursuit of a public purpose.54 The grant theory rec-
ognized the corporation as an artificial being created by the state
with powers strictly limited by its charter.55 Legislative bribery, polit-
ical favoritism, and monopoly eventually led to free incorporation,
which made corporations universally available in the United States
48. Genoa appears to have created the first joint stock company as early as 1346. See
William Mitchell, Early Forms of Partnership, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HIST. 183, 193 (1909). England, Holland, and France created joint stock companies
in the seventeenth century. See id. at 193-94. Joint stock companies descended from char-
tered trade gilds. See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before
1800, 2 HARv. L. REv. 105, 108-10 (1888).
49. See Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1376-77.
50. See id. at 1378.
51. See id.; Williston, supra note 48, at 111 (listing banks, trading companies, and
mines as examples of early joint stock companies).
52. See Simeon Eben Baldwin, History of the Law of Private Corporations in the Colo-
nies and States, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HIST. 236, 243-55 (1909)
(giving examples of early chartered corporations in the colonies and early United States
and identifying early corporate statutes).
53. See Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1394 ("In the late eighteenth and early ni-
neteenth centuries, state legislatures granted charters primarily to the same kinds of firms
that Parliament had typically allowed to incorporate: those that built and ran canals,
bridges, and turnpikes.").
54. See Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 637 (1819) ("They are
deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and, in
most cases, the sole consideration of the grant."); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revi-
sited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985).
55. See Horwitz, supra note 54, at 181.
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by the end of the eighteenth century.56 Such free incorporation un-
dermined the grant theory, and corporations became the preferred
entity for large enterprises .5  Even though the rise of free incorpora-
tion weakened the grant theory, some commentators and law makers
still considered incorporation a privilege into the twentieth century.58
The entity concept followed on the heels of the grant theory, and
lawmakers and commentators developed a list of entity characteris-
tics.59 Early twentieth century characteristics were: (1) free transfera-
bility of interests, (2) continuity of life, (3) limited liability, and (4) cen-
tralized management.6 0 At the turn of the twentieth century, partner-
ships, in contrast to corporations, were not considered entities.6 1 In-
stead, partnerships were considered aggregates of their members.62
The formalities of early corporate laws made the corporate form
unavailable to smaller businesses.6 3 Thus, smaller businesses gener-
ally could not enjoy limited liability and strong entity shielding at the
turn of the twentieth century.4 The use of partnerships and corpora-
tions during that period reveals an understanding that large busi-
nesses (operated as corporations) needed entity shielding and limited
liability to raise sufficient capital. The more intimate nature of a
small business did not mandate those protections, so the partnership
form sufficed for smaller arrangements.
In that environment, Congress enacted the Corporate Excise Tax
of 1909, imposing a tax on the privilege of conducting business in
corporate form.6 5 The limited scope of that act (it applied to corpora-
tions and joint stock companies or associations") gave tax entity
56. See id. Free incorporation did not immediately eliminate monopolistic corporate
grants, which existed through the early nineteenth century. See supra note 53.
57. See Horwitz, supra note 54, at 181.
58. See, e.g., Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 141, 151-52 (1911) (recognizing
that the corporate excise tax was a tax on the privilege of doing business in corporate or
quasi-corporate form).
59. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corpo-
rate Income Tax, 66 IND. L. J. 53, 58-59 (1990).
60. Id. at 61.
61. See Horwitz, supra note 54, at 182.
62. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT, Prefatory Note (1914), 6 U.L.A. 276 (2001).
63. See Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1395.
64. See id. at 1394-95; see also Kornhauser, supra note 59, at 55 (noting that the turn
of the century also witnessed a transformation of capitalism from a system of owner-
managed firms to large nonowner-managed corporations); Richard Winchester, Corpora-
tions That Weren't: The Taxation of Firm Profits in Historical Perspective, 19 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (describing particular aspects of the corporate tax in its
earliest years in the United States).
65. See Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (requiring that a business
"shall be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to the carrying on or
doing business by such corporation") (emphasis added).
66. The wording of the statute left some ambiguity about its scope. It applied to "every
corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and having a capital
stock represented by shares ... ." Id. Treasury interpreted that language in a manner that
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classification its modern significance.6 7 As interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, the corporate excise tax applied only to corporations
and statutory joint stock companies organized under state law.6 That
original model for classifying tax entities was formalistic, depending
on the manner in which the arrangement was formed.
The excise tax on corporations reflected the grant theory's focus on
the corporate privilege. 69 The Supreme Court's narrow reading of the
Act's scope also reflects that view,70 even though substantive law's
understanding of corporations had adopted the entity view several
years earlier. This demonstrates that modern tax law's original enti-
ty classification model lagged behind the legal understanding of cor-
porations. To the Supreme Court's credit, however, an excise tax on
the corporate privilege does have some policy appeal. Because the
state grants the corporate privilege and provides a setting for corpo-
rations to flourish, a tax on such privilege seems reasonable.71 With
that justification, the tax should only apply to state-law corporations,
so the Supreme Court's ruling was consistent with the policy justifi-
cation for the tax.
Congress enacted the corporate excise tax out of concern that the
Supreme Court might declare an income tax unconstitutional or be
forced to overturn its earlier decision.72 The corporate excise tax was
also a stopgap to appease income tax proponents while lawmakers
worked to amend the Constitution to grant Congress the power to tax
income. 73 Following the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in
1913, which gave Congress the power to tax income "from whatever
applied the statute to corporations, joint stock companies, and associations. See Treas. Reg.
31, T.D. 1571, 12 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 131 (1909). The Supreme Court appeared to agree that
associations, as long as they were organized under state law, could be an independent con-
cept. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 141, 151-52 (1911) (identifying the tax as on
the privilege of doing business in corporate or quasi-corporate form).
67. The first U.S. tax law to distinguish between corporations and other entities was
the Revenue Act of 1894, which imposed an entity level income tax on corporations but not
on partnerships. See Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. The Supreme
Court declared the act unconstitutional within a year of its enactment. See generally Pol-
lock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895), modified by 158 U.S. 601
(1895). For a comprehensive review of the definition of "tax corporation up" to 1995, see
generally Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH.
U. L. REV. 437 (1995).
68. See Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178, 185-87 (1911) (placing emphasis on whether
an entity is organized under a state's statute).
69. See source cited supra note 65.
70. See Eliot, 220 U.S. at 185-87 (emphasizing organization under state law).
71. See Kornhauser, supra note 59, at 100 (quoting President Taft as supporting the
tax on the "'privilege of doing business as an artificial entity' ").
72. See Hobbs, supra note 67, at 454-55.
73. Kornhauser, supra note 59, at 93. Although commentators and lawmakers de-
bated whether Pollock truly prevented the enactment of an income tax, enough doubt ex-
isted to warrant the amendment to the Constitution in 1913. See ERIK M. JENSEN, THE
TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 56-66 (2005).
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source derived, without apportionment, 7 4 Congress enacted a corpo-
rate income tax.7 5 That act specifically provided that partnerships
were not subject to income tax, but partners would pay tax on their
respective shares of partnership income. 6 The corporate income tax
applied only to "corporation[s], joint-stock compan[ies], or associa-
tion[s] ... no matter how created or organized .... -77 This language
eliminated the requirement that tax corporations be organized under
a state statute and elevated legal substance over legal form. Some
doubt lingered, however, about whether the definition included asso-
ciations. Subsequent legislation clarified that the corporate tax ap-
plied to associations.78  That modification required Treasury and
courts to define association.
Early on, Treasury adopted regulations defining associations to
include certain state-law partnerships and business trusts.79 Later,
Treasury clarified the definition with regulations that listed entity
characteristics: (1) profit-seeking activity, (2) continuity of existence,
(3) centralization of management, (4) ability to hold property, (5) abil-
ity to sue and be sued, and (6) limited liability.80 Shortly thereafter,
in 1935, the Supreme Court used the entity characteristics to hold
that a trust resembling a corporation was a tax corporation."1 The
Court's use of the entity characteristics became known as the corpo-
rate resemblance test. 2 Thus, more than thirty years after substan-
tive law adopted an entity view of corporations, tax law incorporated
that view into its classification model.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
75. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.G.(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
76. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.D., 38 Stat. 114, 169.
77. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § H.G.(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172. That statute was not with-
out its problems, however, respecting the definition of taxable entities. See Hobbs, supra note
67, at 463-66 (explaining that the statute left unresolved whether the phrase "however
created or organized" applied to each of the listed terms or only to insurance companies).
78. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1, 40 Stat. 1057, 1058 (defining tax corporation
to include "associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies").
79. The regulations provided that a trust would be an association for tax purposes if it
engaged in business and the beneficiaries controlled the trustees' activities. See Treas. Reg.
45, art. 1504, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 591 (1921). Under the regulations, a part-
nership was an association for tax purposes if its interests were freely transferable and
some of the members were passive investors. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1503, T.D. 3146, 23
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 591-92 (1921). A limited partnership was an association for tax pur-
poses if the partnership provided limited liability, freely transferable interests, and the
right to sue in the name of the partnership. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas.
Dec. Int. Rev. 592 (1921).
80. Hobbs, supra note 67, at 476; see Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-3 (1934) (describing cha-
racteristics that cause a trust to be a tax corporation).
81. See Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1935) (finding that the trust held
title to property, had centralized management, continuity of existence, provided owners li-
mited liability, and carried on a real estate development business).
82. Hobbs, supra note 67, at 478.
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The classification model's use of the entity characteristics is a
mystery from a tax policy perspective. The statute required a division
between arrangements subject to the corporate tax and arrange-
ments not subject to the corporate tax. An accurate division would
require a clear policy position for entity taxation. Such a position was
nonexistent.8 The lack of clear policy reasons for the corporate in-
come tax indicates that the courts and Treasury adopted the corpo-
rate resemblance test merely to clarify ambiguous terms. The charac-
teristics themselves did not define parties' economic interests, but
the law did not adequately express the economic interests the corpo-
rate tax should cover.
In 1954, the corporate resemblance test cost the IRS a challenge of
a taxpayer's corporate classification.84 Treasury followed that defeat
by amending its regulations to include the characteristics and estab-
lish that each characteristic has equal weight. Additionally, Treasury
regulations were amended to provide that an arrangement must pos-
sess more than half the characteristics to be a tax corporation.8 5 The
new regulations became known as the Kintner Regulations, taking
the name of the case the IRS lost.86 The Kintner Regulations ended
any connection between the substantive law understanding of entity
classification and tax law's classification model. Substantive law rec-
ognized entity characteristics but did not have a bright-line scorecard
for classifying arrangements. Recall from above that the substantive
law developed legal forms with entity characteristics to meet the de-
mands of economic activity. 7 Owners of capital and labor needed ent-
ity shielding, limited liability, perpetual business forms, centralized
management, and investor liquidity to successfully and efficiently
conduct business in the expanding economy.8 Such characteristics
are attractive to members of smaller business arrangements and, as
corporations became accessible to all forms of business, more small
businesses incorporated. 9 The business and economic needs for such
characteristics explain their existence, but the characteristics do not
justify a model for classifying tax entities. Such characteristics may
not affect the economic rights of the parties.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 90-96.
84. See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1954) (holding that an
unincorporated association to practice medicine and "endowed with the 'attributes of a cor-
poration' "by the members was a tax corporation).
85. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2), -2(a)(3) (1961) (listing the following slightly dif-
ferent characteristics: (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on business and divide the
gains therefrom, (3) continuity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5) liability for
corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (6) free transferability of interests).
86. Hobbs, supra note 67, at 485.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 45-62.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
89. Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1396.
[Vol. 37:245
RESID UAL-RISK CLASSIFICATION MODEL
The Kintner Regulations' lack of support may stem from the gen-
eral lack of policy support for corporate income tax. None of the rea-
sons espoused for enacting a corporate tax provide a satisfactory jus-
tification for entity taxation and its boundaries. 90 An examination of
just one convincing explanation reveals the general lack of tax policy
justifications in this area. One explanation for the early corporate
income tax is that Congress used it to obtain information from
corporations that had grown significantly but remained unregu-
lated.91 That explanation may very well describe the motivation for
the early corporate tax provisions, but subsequent securities regula-
tion would have made the rationale obsolete.92 Furthermore, the ra-
tionale does not reflect sound tax policy. The use of tax law to regu-
late business disguises Congress's exercise of police power and di-
verts the taxing authority from its primary purpose of raising reve-
nue equitably and efficiently.
Over the decades, tax law has taxed corporate distributions at va-
rying rates, which generally imposed a double tax on corporate in-
come.9 3 Commentators have bemoaned the double tax and called for
its repeal;9 4 and proponents have generally been unable to offer a sa-
tisfactory policy explanation for its existence. One explanation is the
lock-in theory, which provides generally that management prefers
the tax on corporate distributions because it creates a disincentive for
90. For an in-depth critique of the various theories, see generally Field, supra note 14.
One commentator argues in favor of the corporate income tax based largely on a variety of
factors, including its progressive venture, ability to raise revenues efficiently, ability to
prevent unlimited deferral, political acceptance, entrenchment in our current system, and
the significant costs that would result from its repeal. See Kim Brooks, Learning to Live
with an Imperfect Tax A Defence of the Corporate Tax, 36 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 621,
630-54 (2003). Those arguments, although compelling in the existing environment, do not
support the original enactment of the corporate income tax. Other commentators have be-
grudgingly agreed that antideferral justifies entity taxation. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming,
Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Di-
mension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 503-06 (2008) (suggesting that the entity tax is a "crude,
second-best anti-deferral device").
91. See Kornhauser, supra note 59, at 113-33.
92. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006) (requiring registration
of securities); Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006) (describing the information
required in a registration statement).
93. See generally Winchester, supra note 64.
94. See, e.g., TREASURY REPORT supra note 23, at 1-12 (identifying the distortive nature
of a double-tax regime); Fred W. Peel, A Proposal for Eliminating Double Taxation of Corpo-
rate Dividends, 39 TAX LAW. 1, 2-5 (1985) (recounting the objections to double taxation); Ka-
therine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1098-1103 (2000) (recounting the equity and efficiency arguments against the corporate tax);
George KI Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 TAX L.
REV. 431, 431, 480-501 (1992) (recognizing that the double-tax on corporate income distorts
the basic choice of entity and the choice between debt and equity financing and recommend-
ing two low rate taxes on distributed income to help eliminate distortions).
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the owners to demand distributions. 5 Although the lock-in theory
may explain the continued existence of the tax on dividends from a
public choice perspective, it does not support a satisfactory tax policy
argument. Management's business preferences should not dictate the
direction of tax law. Finally, the entity characteristics that make
lock-in possible, in particular entity shielding, are available to many
arrangements that are not taxed as corporations.96
With no satisfactory reason for the corporate tax and second tax
on distributions, current corporate tax appears to be a product of
tradition, surviving from the original 1909 act, and an extra source of
revenue. 97 Tax law appears to have merely adopted the substantive
law concept of entity and the entity characteristics to define tax
corporation. With no policy direction supporting such adoption, how-
ever, the law eventually became formalistic, abandoning any notion
of policy support.
B. Elective Model and Private Ordering of Tax Liability
Despite their significant shortcomings, the Kintner Regulations
became entrenched in the law. Tax planners began to obtain the clas-
sification that provided business owners the most favorable tax
treatment.98 Using the Kintner Regulations and skilled document
drafting, lawyers could create either a tax partnership or tax corpo-
ration according to their clients' tax preferences.9 9 Creating entity
characteristics through contract can, however, be cumbersome and
add to the cost of business formation. To make characteristics more
accessible to noncorporations, business people began lobbying state
legislatures to create hybrid entities that would provide desired cha-
racteristics but grant leeway to avoid some entity characteristics. 1°°
The Wyoming legislature responded to those efforts, creating the first
95. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate
Taxation, 105 YALE L. J. 325, 359-62 (1995) (arguing that managers often do not support
the double tax, but they may if their interests diverge from shareholders and if they prefer
retaining earnings within the corporation); Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of
the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889 (2006) (presenting historical evidence that the
corporate income tax and tax on distributions is intended to discourage capital distribu-
tions from corporations).
96. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 502, 504 (1997), 6 U.L.A. 156, 156, 160 (2001) (limiting a
creditor's claim from a partner's judgment to that partner's transferable interest in the
partnership). But see UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801(1) (1997) (providing that the withdrawal of a
partner in an at-will partnership will dissolve the partnership, eliminating the lock-in ef-
fect). The limited use of at-will partnerships suggests that the lock-in effect is fairly preva-
lent in businesses.
97. See generally Brooks, supra note 90, at 647-51.
98. See Field, supra note 14, at 75.
99. See Victor E. Fleischer, Note, "If it Looks Like a Duck" Corporate Resemblance
and Check-the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 518, 527 (1996).
100. See William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 855, 857 (1995).
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limited liability company in 1977.101 Limited liability companies pro-
vide their members limited liability and sufficient drafting flexibility
so they can avoid unwanted entity characteristics and tax corpora-
tion classification. After Wyoming created the limited liability com-
pany, the IRS blessed the classification of a properly structured li-
mited liability company as a tax partnership. 1 2 A subsequent 1988
ruling ignited an explosive growth of limited liability company acts. 10 3
The spread of limited liability company popularity was the result
of economic needs converging with tax wants. Business arrange-
ments of all sizes needed some of the entity characteristics, but they
also wanted the greatest possible flexibility in managing their tax af-
fairs. State limited liability company acts and the 1988 IRS ruling al-
lowed those two preferences to merge. Although an attractive combi-
nation to business owners, the merger of economic needs and tax
wants neglects tax policy.
By ruling that limited liability companies could be tax partner-
ships, the IRS created a de facto elective regime for classifying tax
entities. Such a classification model has serious policy deficiencies.
First, an elective regime taxes similarly situated taxpayers different-
ly. For example, two entities could possess all of the same corporate
characteristics other than continuity of life and free transferability of
interests (which are arguably immaterial from a tax policy perspec-
tive), and tax law could treat them differently. 10 4 Second, the elective
regime created administrative complexity as taxpayers had to spend
more resources to obtain the desired tax treatment, and the IRS had
to spend more resources to consider tax entity classification. 10 5 Such
treatment favors the well-advised taxpayers and places a larger tax
burden on the unrepresented taxpayer. 10 6 Third, the de facto election
allows business owners to privately affect the placement of the inci-
dence of taxation by modifying legal documents. As a result, the re-
gime is not efficient.
Even though inequity and inefficiency are legitimate policy con-
cerns, the regime itself focused on the significantly less substantial
101. See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537.
102. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980) (ruling that a limited liability
company lacking continuity of life and free transferability of interests was a tax partnership).
103. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (ruling that a Wyoming limited liability company
could be a tax partnership); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Cata-
lyst Exposing the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 403-04 (1996)
(identifying that all fifty states had limited liability company statutes by 1996).
104. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980).
105. See Dean, supra note 14, at 453-55 (describing the complexity that arises when
the choice of entity classification intersects with other provisions of a complex income tax
structure and distinguishes between well-advised taxpayers and others).
106. This assumes that government revenue needs to remain constant, and where one
individual's tax burden decreases, another's increases.
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concern of administrative complexity. Commentators began advocat-
ing a de jure elective model that would replace the de facto elective
model in the Kintner Regulations. 10 7 The rationale appeared to be
fairly straight forward: the current system was elective and complex,
so a simple elective regime would be better.10 8 The promulgation of
the check-the-box regulations is evidence that Treasury embraced the
simplicity argument. 0 9 The check-the-box regulations provide that all
entities incorporated under state law are tax corporations, and all
other multiple-member business entities are tax partnerships by de-
fault."0 Tax partnerships and single-member business entities may,
however, elect to be tax corporations'-thus the appellation, "check-
the-box regulations."
The check-the-box regulations simplified the elective classification
model but exacerbated inequity and inefficiency.1 2 Under the check-
the-box regulations, tax law may treat two identical legal entities dif-
ferently. For example, an electing partnership is a tax corporation
while a non-electing partnership is a tax partnership, even though
they are legally and economically identical. Tax policy does not sup-
port sacrificing equity for simplicity, and commentators now criticize
the elective classification model because it adds complexity to the tax
system." 3 Thus, the regulations arguably have no policy support.
107. See Field, supra note 14, at 27-29.
108. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies
and Limited Partnerships: A Case for Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regula-
tions, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 600 (1995) (suggesting the check-the-box election would simpl-
ify the classification process and recognizing that "the well advised have always been able
to avoid the corporate tax by forming as a partnership or LLC that complies with the clas-
sification regulations or a corporation that pays out its earnings in deductible items or
elects Subchapter S').
109. See Preamble to the Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg.
21,989 (1996) (proposed May 13, 1996) ('CTreasury and the IRS believe that it is appropriate
to replace the increasingly formalistic rules under the [Kintner Regulations] with a much
simpler approach that generally is elective."). Commentators and practitioners generally
hailed the promulgations of the check-the-box regulations as a good thing. See, e.g., Michael
L. Schler, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed 'Check-the-Box'Regulations, 71 TAX NOTES 1679,
1681 (June 17, 1996) (suggesting that the regulations were good because they made the elec-
tion easier for sophisticated taxpayers, enabled less-sophisticated taxpayers to make the elec-
tion, and eliminated arbitrary rules). But see Aaron W. Brooks, Chuck the Box: Proposed Ent-
ity Classification Regulations Bring Bad Policy, 70 TAX NOTES 1669, 1674-76 (Mar. 18, 1996)
(arguing that the check-the-box regulations would produce inequities).
110. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). "Business entity" is a term
used in the check-the-box regulations to refer to any arrangement recognized as separate
from its members. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2007).
111. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006).
112. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 109, at 1674-76; Field, supra note 14, at 160-63.
113. See Field, supra note 14, at 52-67. See also Dean, supra note 14, at 453-55;
George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimu-
lated by the "Check-the-Box" Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 125, 130 (1997) ("The taxpayer
must incur the transaction cost of evaluating all tax consequences of the available options
before making an informed choice.!).
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The continuing evolution of legal entities provides business own-
ers significant leeway to privately order their tax affairs. From the
relative statutory rigidity of the corporation to the almost unre-
stricted flexibility of statutory business trusts and general partner-
ships, business owners are able to choose the legal characteristics
their entities will take.114 The check-the-box regulations allow busi-
ness owners to choose from an array of tax alternatives, regardless of
business owners' economic arrangements.15 Now, arrangements of
all sizes possess entity characteristics and can choose their favored
tax classification.16 Tax law has, therefore, by and large turned enti-
ty classification over to business owners." 7 The current entity classi-
fication model prioritizes simplicity above economic reality.
C. Tax Partnership Versus Disregarded Arrangement
An often overlooked classification issue is the difference between
tax partnerships and disregarded arrangements, which include em-
ployment, financing, leasing, and co-ownership arrangements." s
Business arrangements that are not tax corporations should general-
ly be tax partnerships or disregarded arrangements."19 Unlike the
bright-line test that distinguishes tax partnerships from tax corpora-
tions, the undeveloped and confusing definition of tax partnership
distinguishes tax partnerships from disregarded arrangements. 20 An
114. See Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1396-97 (describing the evolution of the
law of business entities as a result of the tax entity classification rules and the most recent
emergence of the statutory business trust, which grants entity shielding and limited liabil-
ity but otherwise leaves the contractual arrangement to the owners).
115. Commentators have also criticized the check-the-box regulations for their short-
comings with respect to non-U.S. entities. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, Options
to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, JCS-02-05 at 182-85 (Jan. 27,
2005); American Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59
TAX LAw. 649, 668-69 (2006). Tax entity classification requires significant attention. Un-
fortunately, the length of this Article does not permit a consideration of the entity classifi-
cation rules that apply to foreign entities.
116. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006) (providing an elective classifi-
cation regime); Hansmann, et al., supra note 21, at 1394-99 (explaining that business partic-
ipants have a significant variety of legal forms to choose from when forming an entity).
117. The only exception is for certain publicly traded arrangements, which the law
treats as tax corporations. I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2006).
118. See Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 HOUS. L.
REv. 925, 936-41 (2006).
119. Business arrangements also include real estate investment trusts and other types of
tax arrangements. However, this Article confines its consideration to tax corporations, tax part-
nerships, and disregarded arrangements, leaving other arrangements for future consideration.
120. See WILLIAM S. MCKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON & ROBERT L. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, 3.01 (3d ed. 2004) ("The most basic, and
perhaps the most difficult, problem in the taxation of partnerships and partners is the de-
termination whether a particular financial, business, or otherwise economic arrangement
constitutes a partnership for income tax purposes."); Bradley T. Borden, A Catalogue of Le-
gal Authority Addressing the Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, in 804 TAX PLANNING
FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCs, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC
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arrangement that comes within the definition of tax partnership may
use the partnership tax accounting and reporting rules for abusive
purposes. For example, recent tax shelter transactions used sham
partnerships to shield hundreds of millions of dollars of taxes from
the government. 121 Investment advisors use tax partnerships to con-
vert compensation into long-term capital gain.122 Partners may also
use the allocation rules to gain tax advantages. 123
History partially explains the unclear definition of tax partner-
ship. Tax law originally disregarded tax partnerships in an era when
legal theory was uncertain about the nature of tax partnerships, gen-
erally considering them aggregates of their owners. 124 Partnership
tax law added entity components to facilitate tax administration, but
it has retained the aggregate view of tax partnerships to the extent
possible.125 The initial disregard and later addition of entity compo-
nents describe aggregate-plus taxation. Tax policy, therefore, sug-
gests that the definition of tax partnership should include only ar-
rangements that require partnership tax accounting and reporting
rules for the efficient administration of taxes. The evolution of the de-
finition does not, however, appear to recognize that policy norm. A
review of existing law uncovers tests used to define tax partner-
ships,26 but nothing more than very general statements summarize
the existing definition of tax partnership.
There are two questions regarding the federal definition of tax
partnership. The first question is whether an arrangement is a tax
partnership or an employment, financing, or leasing arrangement.
This generally depends on whether the parties share control of the ar-
rangement.127 Such arrangements join services and property. If the
ALLIANCES 481, 495-542 (2008) (summarizing more than 125 statutes, cases, regulations,
and rulings that have considered the definition of tax partnership); Borden, supra note
118, at 970-1031 (exploring the current state of the definition of tax partnership).
121. See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); Andantech
L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 331 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 2003); SABA P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 1135
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
122. See Polsky, supra note 4, at 752 ("The goal of management fee conversions is to
convert current ordinary compensation income into deferred capital gain without affecting
the basic economic arrangement between managers and investors.").
123. See Borden, supra note 10, at 338-44.
124. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § LI.D., 38 Stat. 114, 169 (disregarding partnerships).
The debates of Professors Judson A. Crane and William Draper Lewis illustrate the disagree-
ment about the nature of partnerships at the time Congress enacted the income tax. See gener-
ally Judson A. Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act: A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REV. 762 (1915)
(arguing that several provisions of the UPA treat partnerships as entities); William Draper
Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV. 158
(1915) (arguing that the UPA does not adopt an entity concept of partnerships).
125. See Borden, supra note 26, at 722.
126. See Borden, supra note 118, at 975-1001 (discussing ten tests that emerge from
the case law and rulings).
127. See, e.g., Tate v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 514, 517 (D. Minn. 1955) (explaining that con-
trol is important in classifying an arrangement).
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owner of property controls the arrangement, it should be an employ-
ment arrangement. If the owner of service controls the arrangement, it
would likely be a lease or a loan. 128 If the parties jointly control the
property and provide services, the arrangement should be a tax part-
nership.129 However, the law does not clearly define the level of control
the member must have for the arrangement to be a tax partnership.
The second question is whether an arrangement is a tax partner-
ship or a tenancy in common. The answer to that question generally
depends on the source and type of services provided with respect to
co-owned property.1 30 If co-owners provide no services with respect to
the property and do not hire anyone to provide services with respect
to the property, the arrangement should be a tenancy in common. 13 1
Furthermore, if the co-owners provide no services and hire a manag-
er to provide customary tenant services, the arrangement should be a
tenancy in common.132 If, however, one of the co-owners provides ser-
vices with respect to the property, or if a hired manager provides
more than customary tenant services, the arrangement should be-
come a tax partnership. 133
Those general concepts derive from the authority addressing the
definition of tax partnership, but reasonable people may disagree
about the accuracy of such general conclusions. They also may dis-
pute the extent to which state law classification, other than corporate
classification, should affect the definition of tax partnership. For ex-
ample, this Article argues that state law classification should not
control the definition of tax partnership. 3 4 If two parties own proper-
ty in a limited liability company and no services are provided with
respect to the property, the arrangement should not be a tax partner-
ship. 135 Otherwise, the definition of tax partnership could subject
identical economic arrangements (a co-ownership and a limited liabil-
ity company, each with no activity) to different tax regimes. 13 6 Other
commentators may argue that all limited liability companies or other
state law business entities (other than corporations and entities mak-
ing the check-the-box election) should be tax partnerships, regardless
of the lack of entity-level activity.
128. See Borden, supra note 26, at 744-52.
129. See Cusick v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 241, 243 (1998) (finding that co-owners
who contributed customary tenant services were partners).
130. See Borden, supra note 118, at 995-98.
131. See id. at 991-98.
132. See Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261.
133. See Cusick, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 243 (finding that co-owners who contributed cus-
tomary tenant services were partners); Borden, supra note 118, at 994.
134. Borden, supra note 118, at 1010-11.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 1011.
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The lack of a clear definition of tax partnership grants business
participants leeway in structuring arrangements to qualify for the
partnership tax rules. The choice between disregarded arrangement
and tax partnership can, therefore, be elective for some arrange-
ments. Choosing between the two types of arrangements empowers
business participants to privately order the placement of the tax bur-
den.137 Once within the definition of tax partnership, business people
may further shift the tax burden using the allocation rules. 138 Thus,
the current definition of tax partnership neglects horizontal equity by
allowing members of partnerships to obtain tax treatment that is un-
available to persons who are not members of tax partnerships.
In summary, state law and legal labels fail to provide a policy-
supported tax-classification model for business arrangements. In-
stead, such factors make tax classification elective and empower tax-
payers to privately order the tax burden. The shortfall of the current
classification model is its neglect of the economic aspects of business
arrangements. The economic theory of the firm helps explain the
economic aspects of business arrangements. In particular, residual
risk helps measure the economic aspects of an arrangement and pro-
vides a basis for classifying tax entities and subjecting them to the
various tax regimes.
III. RESIDUAL RISK
Residual risk is an economic concept that measures the economic
rights and obligations of parties. Economic measures should signifi-
cantly affect the classification of business arrangements. Non-tax
terms such as corporation, partnership, limited liability company, li-
mited partnership, and statutory trust become mere descriptions of
various levels of off-the-rack state law contractual terms.1 39 The de-
fault terms vary in degree of rigidity from the strict provisions in
corporate statutes to significant freedom of contract available to
members of partnerships, limited liability companies, and statutory
business trusts. Members of corporations often cannot "term-down"
(i.e., relax the rules found in corporate statutes) corporate governing
137. For example, if parties choose to structure an arrangement for services as an em-
ployment contract, payments to the service provider to terminate the contract will be ordi-
nary income. See Luna v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1076-77 (1964). If the same arrangement
were a limited liability company taxed as tax partnership, payments to terminate the
partnership could be capital gain. See I.R.C. §§ 731(a), 741 (2006). See also supra text ac-
companying notes 4-6 (describing the use of limited liability companies to alter the classi-
fication of employment arrangements).
138. See Borden, supra note 10, at 338-40 (describing tax item transaction within
tax partnerships).
139. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 34-35 (suggesting that state enti-
ty laws provide rules that are common in many contracts and save the parties having to
negotiate such terms upon the formation of every new entity).
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documents. 140 Members of other legal entities can, however, "term-
up" (i.e., add contractual provisions that create corporate-like
attributes for noncorporations) governing documents to create ar-
rangements that are economically and legally identical to corpora-
tions.14 1 The ability to create economic and legal equivalents with
various types of legal forms suggests that the classification model
should disregard legal forms.
The neoclassical economic understanding of the firm neglects legal
formalities. It views the "private corporation or firm [as] simply one
form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relation-
ships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible re-
sidual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization ....
"[E]mphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other
organizations focuses attention on ... why particular sets of contrac-
tual relations arise for various types of organizations [and] what the
consequences of these contractual relations are[.] 1 4 3 Such focus leads
to a policy-based model for classifying business arrangements. View-
ing a business arrangement as a nexus of contracts allows tax law to
consider the economic essence of the arrangement and assess the
parties' rights and obligations. Tax law can then apply a tax regime
to the arrangement based upon the economic attributes that flow to
the respective members of the arrangement.
In addition to viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts, economic
theory embraces the concept of residual risk. Residual risk is "the dif-
ference between stochastic inflows of resources and promised pay-
ments to agents.1 44 Consequently, bearers of residual risk share the
residual assets of an arrangement after the arrangement has satisfied
all of its obligations. In a corporation, the residual risk bearers are the
shareholders; in a partnership, the residual risk bearers are the part-
ners. A sole proprietor or sole owner of property bears the residual risk
140. For example, state law generally requires corporations to have at least one class of
stock, make distributions according to the outstanding stock, and follow certain governance
formalities. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.01(b) (1984) (amended 2007) (requiring at least
one class of stock); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.05(a) (1984) (amended 2007) (requiring dis-
tributions in accordance with outstanding stock); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.01-8.70 (1984)
(amended 2007) (providing rules about meetings, voting, and directors and officers).
141. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, § 110 (2006), 6B U.LA 442, 442-44 (2008) (al-
lowing members of limited liability companies to adopt governing partnership agreements).
142. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 311. The nexus of contract view of the firm
is not without its skeptics. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Cor-
poration: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989) (describing the nexus of con-
tract theory and suggesting that the economic theories cannot always be transported into
the corporate law context). Many legal scholars have, nonetheless, incorporated the con-
cept into their work. Id. at 408, nn.5-6 (listing legal articles that incorporate the theory of
the firm).
143. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 311.
144. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 (1983).
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of the business or property. The residual risk bearer's claim to the re-
sidual assets of an arrangement represents that person's residual
claim. 'The central contracts in any organization specify ... the nature
of residual claims .... -145 In the case of corporations, state law and the
type and number of outstanding shares determine the shareholders'
residual claims. 146 Members of the other commonly used legal entities
establish the nature of residual claims by contract or rely upon state
default rules. 147 If an arrangement's central contracts specify the na-
ture of the parties' residual claims, they should take precedence over
the form or label given to an arrangement.
A simple business model sets the stage for considering residual
risk and identifying parties' residual claims. 148 Assume two people
join together to form a business. Adrian contributes property worth
$1,000,000 and agrees to help manage the business, and Bakke
agrees to provide services. During the first year of operation, the
business has $100,000 of profits. Every year thereafter, the profit of
the business randomly fluctuates, reasonably representing the per-
formance of a typical business. The value of the property log normally
fluctuates over the years, representing the expected gain or loss of
a typical piece of property. Assuming the business does not make
any distributions, the value of its residual assets will be the sum of
the property value (the original $1,000,000 adjusted to reflect
changes in its value following the formation of the business) and ac-
cumulated profits.1 49 The model assumes that the business has no
goodwill or going concern value and that it can liquidate its assets
with no transaction costs.150
Using information from the hypothetical business's performance
and the arrangement's governing rules, the parties could determine
their shares of the arrangement's residual value (i.e., their residual
claims) at the end of each year. Their residual claims depend upon
the type of entity they choose, the property's change in value, and, if
they choose a noncorporation, the method they use to allocate the
145. Id. at 302.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 172-76.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 178-91(describing the various types of residual
risk and the legal source of such risk).
148. Table 1 of the Appendix summarizes the hypothetical business's performance over
a ten-year period.
149. The use of profits as a metric incorporates expenses into the model. Profits for this
purpose simply mean the excess of revenue over expenses. For the sake of analysis, the
discussion assumes that profits equal taxable income, exclusive of any gain that may be
realized on the disposition of the property.
150. Goodwill or going concern value will not substantively affect the analysis, as such
items will merely add to the residual value of the firm. If the parties do not agree upon
how to allocate any income from goodwill and going concern value, state law will determine
the allocation of such amounts in the case of a partnership. See UNIF. PSHIP. ACT § 103(a)
(1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001).
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profits. The hypothetical company helps describe the three types
of residual risk that the parties may use: (1) unitary residual risk,
(2) allocation-dependent residual risk, and (3) distribution-dependent
residual risk.
A. Unitary Residual Risk
Unitary residual risk is the residual risk born by a single person.
Sole proprietors and sole owners of property bear the unitary resi-
dual risk of the businesses and property. The residual claim in a
piece of property is "the right to control all aspects of the asset that
have not been explicitly given away by contract. '151 A contract be-
tween a printer and a publisher illustrates unitary residual risk.
1 52 If
the contract provides for a specific print job and contains no provision
for an additional run, the party who has the right to decide whether
to expand the print job or do another run holds the residual claim of
the printer and bears its residual risk.153 Similarly, a person who con-
trols the performance of services with respect to a piece of property
bears the residual risk of that property.
5 4
Consider how this concept of unitary residual risk informs the
analysis of various disregarded arrangements. Adrian agrees that in
exchange for Bakke providing services with respect to Adrian's prop-
erty, Adrian will pay forty-five percent of the income from the proper-
ty to Bakke. The agreement does not have a specified duration.
Bakke can stop providing services at any time, and Adrian can dis-
pose of the property at any time. If Bakke unilaterally terminates his
services, Adrian may arrange for someone else to provide the servic-
es. Adrian may also alter the use of the property unilaterally (i.e.,
convert it from apartments to condominiums) and borrow against it
without Bakke's consent. The arrangement is an employment agree-
ment, and because Adrian controls all aspects of the asset that have
not been explicitly contracted away, Adrian bears the unitary resi-
dual risk of the property.
Instead of hiring Bakke, Adrian may decide to grant Bakke the
use of all or a portion of the property for a fixed period of time. The
terms of the agreement may provide that Bakke will pay to Adrian
forty-five percent of any income from the property in exchange for the
right to use the property. Upon termination of the agreement, Adrian
determines what to do with the property. This appears to be a lease,
and Adrian bears the unitary residual risk of the property.
151. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 695 (1986).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 1119, 1121 (1990).
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Some arrangements obfuscate who bears the residual risk of prop-
erty. For example, the property may be farm land, and Adrian and
Bakke may agree that Bakke will manage the land for a fixed period of
time. 5 ' The parties agree to share the produce from the farm equally.
They also agree to share some of the costs of farming the land and
growing the crops. Together, they decide which crops to plant. None-
theless, after the contract terminates, Adrian has the right to control
all aspects of the land. Therefore, Adrian retains the unitary residual
risk in the farmland, and the arrangement is a lease.
Notice that unitary residual risk is not concerned with the control
of the property for the duration of an existing agreement. 156 The focus
is on who controls all aspects of the property following the termina-
tion of the arrangement. To illustrate, Adrian may allow Bakke to
use $1,000,000 for a given period of time and repay the entire
amount plus fifty-five percent of any profit Bakke earns at the end of
that period. After Bakke returns the $1,000,000, Adrian controls all
aspects of the property. Bakke's use of the money throughout the du-
ration of the arrangement is irrelevant. Adrian bears the unitary re-
sidual risk of the $1,000,000, and the arrangement would be a loan. 57
Arrangements with unitary risk are fairly simple, but they may
present opportunities for parties to exploit appropriable quasi-
rents.15 8 For example, if the demand for Bakke's services increases
while he is under contract to provide services with respect to Adrian's
property, Bakke may demand a greater share of the profits. Alterna-
tively, if Adrian realizes that Bakke's situation prevents him from
changing employment, Adrian may require more from him. 59 Eco-
nomic theory suggests that parties in unitary-risk arrangements can
help reduce appropriable quasi-rents by integrating their re-
sources.160 Parties may integrate their resources by contributing
them to some sort of legal entity. For example, Adrian and Bakke
155. This example is from Harlan E. Moore Charitable Trust v. United States, 9 F.3d
623, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1993).
156. Control during the duration of an existing agreement is, however, important in
determining whether an arrangement is a hired-property or hired-services arrangement.
See Borden, supra note 10, at 312-16.
157. Even though the residual-risk analysis determines the arrangement is a loan, the
parties may prefer to classify it as something else to avoid usury laws.
158. An appropriable quasi-rent exists when an asset's value exceeds its salvage value
(i.e., "its value in its next best use to another renter"). Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford
& Armen A- Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Con-
tracting Process, 21 J L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
159. For example, if the property is an apartment complex, Adrian may subdivide the
units and require Bakke to manage more units for the same compensation.
160. See Borden, supra note 26, at 752-61; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 158,
at 307. Parties also integrate resources to reduce transaction costs. See R. H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386, 390-91 (1937). To integrate their property and ser-
vices, Adrian and Bakke must believe that forfeiting unitary residual risk is a lower cost
than the appropriable rents each party would have in a nonintegrated arrangement.
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could integrate their property and services by contributing them to a
limited liability company or corporation. After the parties integrate
their resources, they will have to concern themselves with reducing
agency costs. 161 They can share residual risk in one of two ways to
help reduce agency costs-allocation-dependent residual risk or dis-
tribution-dependent residual risk.
B. Allocation-Dependent Residual Risk
After integrating their resources, Adrian and Bakke may decide
that the best way to reduce agency costs is to use an allocation for-
mula to determine each party's residual risk. Such use of an alloca-
tion formula creates allocation-dependent residual risk. Allocation-
dependent residual risk is the quintessential residual risk that mem-
bers of partnerships bear. Partnership law provides that upon liqui-
dation of a partnership, each partner shall receive the amount con-
tributed to the partnership, plus any profit allocated to the partner,
minus any distributions made to the partner.1 62 Professor Gary S. Ro-
sin describes two approaches courts use to determine the amount
partners receive on liquidation-the unitary approach and the dua-
listic approach. 6 3 Both approaches determine partners' residual
claims as a function of contributions, plus allocations, minus distri-
butions. 164 Thus, residual risk in partnerships depends upon the
allocation formula.
161. See Borden supra note 10, at 309 (describing how parties may use allocations to
reduce agency costs); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 309 (recognizing that even the
most basic arrangements (such as co-authoring an article) create agency costs).
162. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 401, 807(b) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 133, 206 (2001).
163. See Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and Functional-
ism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REv. 395, 446-65 (1989).
164. If partnership expenses exceed revenue, the partnership will have negative profits
and the residual value of the partnership may be less than the amount of contributions.
Decreases in the value of contributed assets may also cause the residual value of partner-
ship assets to be less than the amount contributed. Because members of partnerships are
jointly and severally liable for partnership liabilities, see UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997),
6 U.L.A. 117 (2001), a partnership could have negative residual value. If a partnership
with negative residual value were to liquidate, the partners would be required to make ad-
ditional contributions to satisfy the claims of creditors. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 807(b)
(1997), 6 U.L.A. 206 (2001). To avoid that potentiality, most business owners use a legal
entity, such as a limited liability company, to obtain limited liability protection. Because
the members of a limited liability company are not liable for the debts of the business, a
limited liability company with negative residual value does not expose the members to lia-
bility. Similarly, members of a limited liability company may agree that rights on distribu-
tion shall equal their contributions, plus shares of profits, minus distributions. See UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103(a) (1996), 6A U.L.A. 563 (2003). Otherwise, the default statute
provides that the limited liability company will distribute residual assets in accordance
with members' interests in the company. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 806(b) (1996), 6A
U.L.A. 626 (2003). From a residual risk standpoint, limited liability companies can be very
similar to partnerships; so going forward, this Article refers to all legal arrangements that
determine residual risk as a function of allocations as partnerships, unless stated other-
wise. State law gives all such partnerships allocation-dependent residual risk by default.
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Consider allocation-dependent residual risk as expressed in a hy-
pothetical partnership. Assume that Adrian and Bakke are partners
and they agree to allocate fifty-five percent of the partnership profits
to Adrian and forty-five percent to Bakke. They also agree to allocate
any appreciation from the property thirty-five percent to Adrian and
sixty-five percent to Bakke. They use these allocation formulae to re-
duce agency costs. More specifically, to help ensure that Adrian con-
tributes property with strong income-producing potential, Bakke
insists that Adrian share significantly in the property's income.
To help encourage Bakke to fully perform services that improve
the property's value, Adrian agrees that Bakke will receive a signifi-
cant portion of any gain realized on the disposition of the property.
Thus, Adrian and Bakke use the allocation rules to help reduce agen-
cy costs. Those allocations, in turn, largely determine the parties' re-
sidual claims. 165
Tax law does not attempt to measure the residual risk of partners
on an annual basis. Instead, it carries partnership assets at historic
cost and uses historic cost to determine partners' capital account
balances. 16 6 Partnership tax law uses capital accounts to gauge the
validity of partnership tax item allocations.1 67 The partnership tax
rules provide generally that partners' capital accounts adjust only
for allocations of partnership recognized tax items (e.g., gains on
dispositions of partnership property). 68 Under aggregate-plus taxa-
tion, partners report their share of partnership income only when
the partnership recognizes income, even if the partnership does not
make distributions. 169
Despite tax law's delay in recognizing economic items or a part-
nership's delay in making distributions, partners take an interest
in partnership economic items as residual claimants. Upon liquida-
tion, they would have a right to such amount, and as partners, they
exercise some control over the items' use and disposition. 170 Those
165. Table 2 of the Appendix illustrates the parties' residual claims over a ten-year period.
166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (as amended in 2006) (requiring partners to
adjust their capital accounts for the fair market value of contributed property but adjust-
ing capital accounts thereafter only for realized items).
167. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2) (as amended in 2006) (providing that for an
allocation to have economic effect under the economic effect safe harbor, the partnership
agreement must provide for distributions to be made in accordance with positive capital
account balances). But see Borden, supra note 10, at 334-38 (arguing that capital accounts
are tax-centric and imperfectly measure the economic aspects of a partnership).
168. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (as amended in 2006). An exception to this
rule is adjustments to the book value of assets on the occurrence of certain events, such as
liquidating distributions or the admission of a new partner. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iv)(t) (as amended in 2006).
169. See generally I.R.C. § 702(c) (2006).
170. See, e.g., Fishback v. United States, 215 F.Supp. 621, 626 (D.S.D. 1963) (finding
that parties were joint proprietors and holding that the arrangement was a tax partner-
ship); Luna v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077-78 (1964) (considering whether the parties
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rights help explain the parties' economic interests in an arrange-
ment. Tax law should recognize partners' interests in the economic
performance of partnerships as expressed in their residual claims
and tax them accordingly.
C. Distribution-Dependent Residual Risk
Adrian and Bakke may decide that they can best reduce agency
costs by using distribution-dependent residual risk. They can obtain
that objective using a corporation under state law. Assume the corpo-
ration issues two classes of stock--cumulative preferred and common
stock. The cumulative preferred stock provides the holder with a cu-
mulative eight percent annual dividend and a return-of-capital prefe-
rence on dissolution of the corporation. The common stock provides
one vote for each share and a right to distributions upon liquidation
in proportion to shares held. Adrian contributes $1,000,000 to the
corporation for 1,000 shares of preferred stock. The corporation is-
sues fifty shares of common stock to each of Adrian and Bakke in ex-
change for services they will perform. 7' In this hypothetical corpora-
tion, each shareholder's residual claim depends on the manner in
which the corporation distributes the residual assets as determined
by the shareholders' stock ownership.
Consider why Adrian and Bakke might use distribution-
dependant residual risk instead of allocation-dependant residual
risk. For example, Adrian may wish to align Bakke's economic inter-
ests generally with her own economic interests. She may believe the
best way to align their interests is to provide Bakke a general inter-
est in the sum of the business's performance and the property's ap-
preciation. Adrian's opportunity cost of investing in the business may
require Bakke to agree to an eight percent preferred coupon for
Adrian's contribution. Adrian's sharing in the profit as a holder of
common stock will encourage her to use her capital allocation exper-
tise to help maximize corporate performance. The shareholders' resi-
dual claims depend on the overall performance of the business.
State law imposes distribution-dependent residual risk on corpo-
rations, and shareholders cannot contract out of it. Corporate law
provides that upon dissolution, a corporation disposes of its assets,
shared control and responsibilities of the enterprise in holding that no partnership ex-
isted); Beck Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 840, 852-53 (1957) (finding that the
parties had mutual proprietary interest in profits and holding that the arrangement was a
tax partnership).
171. Upon receipt of the shares of stock, Adrian and Bakke must include in their re-
spective gross incomes the fair market value of the shares received. See I.R.C. § 83(a)
(2006). The hypothetical assumes the value of the stock is nominal, so the income tax effect
to Adrian and Bakke would not be significant. Table 3 of the Appendix summarizes the
parties' residual claims.
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discharges its liabilities, and distributes the remaining property to
its shareholders according to their interests. 172 Shareholders' inter-
ests derive from the type of stock they own in relation to the type of
stock owned by other shareholders. Corporate law requires corpora-
tions to issue at least one class of stock, 173 ensuring that at least one
class of shareholders "share in the ultimate residual interest in the
corporation.' 7 4 Corporations may issue multiple classes of stock,1 75
which complicates the computation of shareholders' residual claims
but does not change its focus. 76 Upon liquidation, the corporation
would first distribute Adrian's return on the preferred stock, then
distribute Adrian's contributions for preferred stock, and finally di-
vide any remaining assets according to common stock ownership.
Under the current classification model, the corporation would be a
tax corporation subject to entity taxation. 77 Adrian and Bakke may
prefer the economic benefits of an arrangement with distribution-
dependent residual risk but want to be subject to aggregate-plus tax-
ation. The primacy of contract in noncorporate legal entities allows
members of noncorporations to create distribution-dependent resi-
dual risk. One increasingly popular technique for creating contrac-
tual distribution-dependent residual risk is partnership target alloca-
tions.178 Such arrangements would be tax partnerships under the
current classification model. 179
Target allocations include two components: (1) a tiered distribu-
tion structure, and (2) a distribution-dependent allocation provi-
172. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.05(a) (1984) (amended 2007).
173. See MODEL BUS. CORP. AC § 6.01(b)(1) (1984) (amended 2007).
174. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.01(b) cmt. 2 at 6-5 (1984) (amended 2007).
175. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 6.01(c)(3)-(4) (1984) (amended 2007) (allowing articles of
incorporation to authorize one or more classes or series of stock that "entitle the holders to dis-
tributions calculated in any manner, including dividends that may be cumulative, noncumula-
tive, or partially cumulative; or... have preference over any other class or series of shares with
respect to distributions, including distributions upon the dissolution of the corporation").
176. The various classes of stock may carry different voting rights or distribution prefe-
rences. See id. Only the distribution preferences would affect shareholders' residual claims. A
shareholder's residual claim is merely the residual value of the corporation (i.e., the amount left
after satisfying nonshareholder liability) multiplied by the shareholder's interest in the corpora-
tion. If a corporation has a single class of stock, a shareholder's interest will merely be the num-
ber of shares the shareholder owns divided by the total outstanding shares. If the corporation
has multiple classes of stock with different distribution preferences, a shareholder's interest in
the corporation must account for the different preferences. Table 3, infr, illustrates how differ-
ent distribution preferences affect a shareholder's interest in a corporation.
177. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2008) (defining tax corporation to in-
dude state-law corporations).
178. Other types of arrangements in partnership agreements may create distribution-
dependent residual risk. This Article's use of target allocations as an example of the potential
for creating distribution-dependent residual risk is illustrative of such potential and does not
deem one method to be more or less worthy of the task than another.
179. See Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006).
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sion.18 0 The tiered distribution structure describes how the arrange-
ment will distribute property to its members and therefore describes
the parties' economic arrangement. A simple tiered distribution
structure of a target allocation could have three tiers. Tier One could
provide that to the extent an arrangement has sufficient residual as-
sets, it will first distribute them to property contributors as a fixed
return on contributions."" Tier Two could require the partnership to
distribute property as a return of contributions, to the extent possi-
ble. 1 2 Finally, if property remains after Tier One and Tier Two dis-
tributions, Tier Three could require the arrangement to distribute its
property to the owners in proportion to their ownership interests.
8 3
An example illustrates the distribution structure of target alloca-
tions. Assume Adrian and Bakke form a limited liability company.
Adrian agrees to contribute $1,000,000, and Adrian and Bakke both
agree to provide services with respect to the property. The parties in-
clude target allocations in the company's operating agreement. Tier
One will, to the extent the company has sufficient assets, distribute a
cumulative simple eight percent return on capital to members who
contribute property to the company. To the extent any property re-
mains after the Tier One distribution, Tier Two will return capital
contributions. Tier Three will distribute any remaining company
property between the members equally.184
Notice that Adrian's and Bakke's residual claims in a partnership
with target allocations are identical to the residual claims they would
have as corporate shareholders. 8 5 Upon liquidation, the company
would first distribute an eight percent return to Adrian under Tier
One, then it would return Adrian's contribution under Tier Two, and
finally, under Tier Three, it would distribute remaining assets equal-
ly to Adrian and Bakke. This simple example illustrates that mem-
bers of noncorporate entities may use target allocations to create
economic rights that mirror shareholders' economic rights. The tiered
distribution structure of a target allocation provision is a non-tax
agreement among the parties. They use the tiered structure to obtain
distribution-dependent residual risk for the same reasons sharehold-
ers structure distribution-dependent residual risk. 8 6
180. Terence Floyd Cuff, Working with Target Allocations-Idiot-Proof or Drafting for
Idiots?, 35 REAL EST. TAX'N 116, 124 (2008).
181. See Terence Floyd Cuff, Working with Target Allocations-Drafting in Wonder-
land, 35 REAL EST. TAX'N. 162, 163 (2008).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Table 4 of the Appendix summarizes the parties' residual claim in a partnership
with target allocations.
185. Compare Table 3 with Table 4 of the Appendix.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 177-178 (discussing reasons why parties may
use arrangements with distribution-dependent residual risk).
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Having decided upon the economic arrangement, the parties simply
provide that tax items must be allocated to partners in such a manner
that capital accounts will equal the amount to be distributed to the
partners. 18 7 Such an allocation formula for tax items makes the alloca-
tion a function of the residual claims. The allocations become a plug
figure needed to match capital accounts with distribution amounts."
Such allocations create difficulty and questions for tax law.
Compare taxation allocations in partnerships with target alloca-
tions to allocations in traditional partnerships. Tax-item allocations
in traditional partnerships are independent of residual claims, de-
termined by the partners' agreement or state law. The partners agree
how they will allocate the economic items, and each partner's total al-
locations equal the sum of the individually allocated items. The allo-
cations then determine each partner's residual claim. 189
On the other hand, tax items allocated in a partnership with target
allocations are a function of the partners' residual claims. The alloca-
tions fill in capital accounts to ensure capital account balances reflect
distribution rights.190 Thus, allocations in a partnership with target al-
locations depend on the partnership's distributions. The allocations do
not affect the partners' residual claims. Instead, the distribution for-
mula determines partners' residual claims. Thus, the economics of tra-
ditional partnerships and partnerships with target allocations are
fundamentally different, yet the two arrangements are subject to the
same tax regime. The economics of a partnership with target alloca-
tions are similar to the economics of a corporation, yet those two ar-
rangements are subject to different tax regimes. This Article argues
that tax law should recognize the fundamental economic aspects of ar-
rangements to determine the applicable tax regime.19'
D. Allocation-Distribution Symmetry
The prior sections described the difference between allocation-
dependent residual risk and distribution-dependent residual risk. In
a stochastic economy, sophisticated allocation-dependent residual
risk formulae produce a residual risk that a distribution-dependent
residual risk formula cannot duplicate. For example, a distribution-
dependent residual risk could not mirror the residual claims of the
parties of the traditional partnership.1 92 Perhaps a distribution-
dependent formula could match residual claims in Year 1, but it
187. See Cuff, supra note 181, at 163.
188. See id. at 165 (providing that tax allocations follow modified book income that the
partnership allocates to the partners).
189. See Table 2 of the Appendix.
190. See Cuff, supra note 180, at 124.
191. See infra Section IV.
192. Compare Tables 3 and 4 with Table 2 of the Appendix.
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could not maintain the duplication consistently in subsequent
years. 193 The nonuniform fluctuations of profits and property value
make mirroring the residual claims ex ante impossible. That inability
further illustrates the economic differences of arrangements with the
different types of residual risk. If the allocation or distribution formu-
lae are complex, they will not have symmetry in a stochastic market.
The allocation and distribution structures may, however, have
symmetry if an arrangement is simple. For example, a corporation
with a single class of stock must distribute the residual assets to the
shareholders in proportion to the shares of outstanding stock each
shareholder owns.194 Adrian and Bakke may decide to form a corpora-
tion with one class of stock. Economic considerations would undoub-
tedly motivate that decision. For example, assume Adrian contri-
butes the property to a corporation and causes the corporation to
grant Bakke twenty shares of common stock and the remaining eigh-
ty shares to Adrian.195 Adrian's and Bakke's residual claims are sim-
ple to compute; they are the value of the residual assets of the corpo-
ration multiplied by the proportion of shares each person holds. 96
Each year, Adrian's and Bakke's residual claims are respectively
eighty percent and twenty percent of the corporation's residual value.
Assume alternatively that Adrian and Bakke form a limited liabil-
ity company to take advantage of the management flexibility such an
entity offers. The same economic factors motivate their decision to
form the company. Adrian contributes $1,000,000 of property and
Bakke contributes services to the new company. Adrian and Bakke
take eighty- and twenty-percent interests in the company, respective-
ly. 197 Adrian and Bakke do not include an allocation provision in the
company's operating agreement, so state law dictates that the com-
193. For example, the ratio of Adrian's residual claim to Bakke's residual claim in Year
1 of Table 2 of the Appendix is approximately 1,000 to 57. A corporation could match that
ratio in Year 1 by issuing common stock to its members in that ratio. In Year 2, the ratio of
partners' residual claims is 1,200 to 200. That differs from Year l's residual claims, and it
would differ from the residual claims based upon stock ownership that matched the Year 1
residual claims. The differences would continue in subsequent years.
194. See generally MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.01(b) (1984) (amended 2007).
195. The grant of the shares to Bakke should be a taxable event to Bakke. See I.R.C. §
83(a) (2006). The corporation should get a deduction equal to the amount of income that
Bakke recognizes, assuming the corporation does not have to capitalize the expenditure.
See I.R.C. § 83(h) (2006). If the corporation were to liquidate immediately, Bakke would re-
ceive $200,000. That should roughly equal the amount of income he should recognize upon
joining the corporation, adjusted as appropriate to reflect a minority discount.
196. Table 5 of the Appendix summarizes the parties' claims.
197. The formation includes a capital shift. Because Bakke becomes a twenty percent
member of the company, he should receive twenty percent of the value of any liquidating
distribution. Consequently, the formation of this company includes a capital shift, so
Bakke will recognize gain on the formation equal to the value of the interest he receives.
See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2006); McKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 120, at 5.07. The
partnership should also get a deduction equal to the amount of income that Bakke recog-
nizes, assuming it is not required to capitalize the amount. See I.R.C. § 83(h) (2006).
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pany will allocate eighty percent of profits and losses, including gains
and losses from the sale of the property, to Adrian and the other
twenty percent to Bakke.
198
Notice that the distribution-dependent residual claims of a corpora-
tion with a single class of stock can be identical to the allocation-
dependent residual claims of a limited liability company using a sim-
ple allocation formula. 19 When the capital structure of a corporation
and the allocation method of a partnership are simple, such allocation-
distribution symmetry is possible. Because the same outcome results
with both types of residual risk, economic factors do not appear to dic-
tate the parties' choice of entity. Disregarding tax considerations, other
factors such as management flexibility, ease of formation, or familiari-
ty with a particular legal entity would influence the decision. 20 0
Certain principles emerge from the study of residual risk and busi-
ness law. First, entity forms emerged to satisfy the business needs of
increasingly complex economies and business practices. In particular,
the law evolved to provide entity shielding, limited liability, continuity
of existence, and centralized management. Second, tax law adopted le-
gal forms and labels to classify business arrangements but did not jus-
tify such adoption. Third, legal forms and labels create arbitrary dis-
tinctions between the different tax entities and violate horizontal equi-
ty by classifying economically equivalent arrangements differently and
economically different arrangements similarly. That tax treatment al-
lows well-informed taxpayers to gain a tax advantage over others. 20 1
Fifth, residual risk measures the economic interests parties have in
business arrangements. Residual risk leads to a policy-justified model
for classifying business arrangements for tax purposes.
IV. RESIDUAL-RISK CLASSIFICATION MODEL
Accurate placement of the incidence of taxation is the standard
that governs the model's residual-risk construction. The analysis
begins by considering basic tax situations and progresses to more
complicated arrangements. The analysis demonstrates that natural
law principles support the basic forms of aggregate taxation, aggre-
gate-plus taxation, and entity taxation, depending on an arrange-
ment's type of residual risk, and provides a framework for the new
classification model.
198. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Act § 405(a) (1996), 6A U.L.A. 593 (2003). Table 6 of the
Appendix summarizes the parties' claims.
199. See residual claims in Tables 5 and 6 of the Appendix.
200. See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 210 (2004)
("[P]artnership-type firms offer an agreement-centered approach to centralized manage-
ment that provides flexibility and adaptability.").
201. See Brooks, supra note 109, at 1674-76.
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All economic situations require complex decisionmaking, 0 2 but
some may present relatively straightforward tax problems. For ex-
ample, an employment arrangement presents relatively unsophisti-
cated tax problems. Assume Adrian and Bakke are neighbors. After a
heavy snowstorm, Adrian offers to pay Bakke fifty dollars to shovel
her sidewalks. Bakke's receipt of the fifty dollars represents income
from services, which is subject to income tax.20 3 Bakke recognizes
and reports income upon receipt of the payment. 20 4 Bakke's shoveling
the snow and receiving payment represents a simple services ar-
rangement. Bakke owned only services, so he easily traces the in-
come from his services, recognizes that income, and bears the tax
burden of that income. 205
Wholly-owned property also presents simple tax scenarios. As-
sume now that Adrian owns $1,000,000 of real property. She receives
$50,000 of rent. Her receipt of the rent is income to her.206 If she later
sells the land, any gain she recognizes on the sale should also be in-
come to her.20 7 This simple arrangement represents two important
aspects of all wholly-owned property arrangements. First, the owner
may receive income from the property (rent in this situation). Second,
the owner may receive income from gains recognized on the sale of
property.20 8 The owner can trace either type of income directly from
the property, is required to recognize that income, and must bear the
tax burden of that income.
202. See Hart & Moore, supra note 154, at 1121-25 (considering the economic factors
that go into the decision whether to hire services or provide services oneself); supra text
accompanying note 165 (describing plausible economic decisionmaking).
203. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2006). Bakke may offset that income with any allowed de-
ductions. See I.R.C. § 63(a) (2006). To keep the analysis simple and focused on the primary
issues, this Article assumes that the income items in this Section are more than offsetting
deductions allowed to the respective parties.
204. The U.S. tax system defines gross income broadly to include any "accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the [person] ha[s] complete dominion." Comm'r v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Bakke's performance of services and receipt
of payment for services satisfies that definition of gross income. If a person is an accrual
method taxpayer, realization may occur at a time other than receipt. See I.R.C. § 451(a)
(2006). To keep the analysis simple, this discussion assumes all parties use the cash me-
thod of accounting.
205. Assuming the sidewalks were on Adrian's personal residence, Adrian should have no
deduction because tax law prohibits deductions for personal expenses. I.R.C. § 262(a) (2006).
206. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (2006).
207. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (2006).
208. Id. Several provisions of the Internal Revenue Code allow for nonrecognition on
certain dispositions of property. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006) (providing persons making
qualifying property contributions to corporations in exchange for stock in the corporation
do not recognize gain or loss on the contributions); I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2006) (providing
that property owners do not recognize gain or loss on the exchange of like property held for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment); I.R.C. § 1033(a) (2006) (providing
that property owners who use proceeds from involuntarily converted property to acquire
other qualifying property shall not recognize gain or loss on the involuntary conversion).
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These simple services and property ownership arrangements are
examples of unitary residual risk. Bakke bore the residual risk of his
service, and Adrian bore the residual risk of her property. The simplic-
ity of the arrangements makes identifying the source of the income
straightforward. As sole bearer of the residual risk of his services,
Bakke's income derived only from those services, and as sole bearer of
the residual risk of the real property, Adrian's income derived only
from the property. 209 The income for the services and property easily
traces to the respective risk bearer of each source of income.
This simple example demonstrates that if an arrangement has un-
itary risk, its parties can trace income from resources they own. Tax
law can accurately match the burden of taxation to economic items if
it can trace income from its source to the owner of the source. Tracing
is possible in simple nonintegrated arrangements with unitary resi-
dual risk. However, tracing is not possible when parties integrate re-
sources. Integrated arrangements require aggregate-plus or entity
taxation.
A. Case for Aggregate-Plus Taxation
Tracing income from its source becomes impossible when the par-
ties integrate services and property,21 which parties do by reciprocal-
ly transferring residual claims in the property and services. Thus,
Adrian and Bakke could integrate their resources if Adrian assigned
a portion of the residual claim in her property to Bakke and Bakke
assigned a portion of the residual claim in his services to Adrian. If
Adrian is unable to change the property's use or dispose of it without
Bakke's consent, Adrian has transferred a portion of the residual
claim to Bakke. Adrian retains a portion of the residual claim, how-
ever, because Bakke would be unable to unilaterally control the use
and disposition of the property. Bakke transfers an interest in his
services by giving Adrian a share of the service's residual claim.
Adrian may not be able to legally compel Bakke to provide services,
but if Bakke were to provide similar services to another arrange-
ment, Adrian would have a claim against him for the economic dam-
ages resulting from providing such services. 211
209. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940) (holding that the person who
owned property owned the income from the property); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15
(1930) (holding income from services belongs to the services provider).
210. See Borden, supra note 118, at 953-55.
211. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT, § 404(b)(3) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001) (prohibiting partners
from competing with the partnership); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 12.5, at 745
(4th ed. 2004) (discussing rights of parties harmed in breached service contracts).
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Integration obfuscates the source of the income. 212 Tracing income
separately from integrated resources is impossible. In an integrated
arrangement, income allocated to the parties flows from their inter-
ests in both the property and services. The parties generally will be
unable to ascertain the portion of the income from the integrated ar-
rangement that derives from the respective resources. For example, if
the arrangement has $100,000 of profit, that profit will derive from
contributions of the property and services. The parties cannot, how-
ever, deconstruct the income to determine how much flows respec-
tively from the property and the services. The parties, therefore, can-
not trace income directly from its source to the owner of the source.
That inability to trace requires some method for determining each
party's share of income from the integrated resources.
Aggregate-plus taxation uses allocation rules to address the ina-
bility to trace in integrated arrangements that have allocation-
dependent residual risk.213 Allocation rules should allow the burden
of taxation to follow the allocation of economic items in such inte-
grated arrangements. 214 The example above of the traditional part-
nership illustrates this point.25 Recall that the arrangement had
$100,000 of profit in the first year.21 6 The agreement between Adrian
and Bakke provided that the partnership would allocate $65,000 of
that profit to Adrian and $35,000 to Bakke. The agreement, however,
provided that the arrangement will not distribute the amounts to the
parties for some time. Nonetheless, the allocated income items be-
come a part of the parties' residual claims because the arrangement
212. Thus, even if the profit-sharing ratio and the gain-sharing ratio of the noninte-
grated arrangement are identical to the ratios of the integrated arrangement, identifying
the source of income in the integrated arrangement is not possible. Focusing on the contri-
buted item also fails to identify the source of income. See Borden, supra note 26, at 753.
The essence of an integrated arrangement is the reciprocal ownership in all contributed
items and a right to income from each.
213. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2006) (providing extensive and
complicated partnership allocation rules).
214. The current allocation rules allow tax to follow the economic items, but probably
do not require them to follow the economics. See I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (2006) (requiring alloca-
tions to have substantial economic effect); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a) (as amended in
2006) (requiring economic benefit or burden to follow tax item). The rules also allow for
some gaming of the tax system. See Borden, supra note 10, at 338-44 (discussing the abili-
ty to use the current rules to internalize tax-item transactions). Lawmakers should modify
the rules to ensure that the incidence of taxation always follows the allocation of the eco-
nomic items. This Article recommends an ideal tax entity classification model. Such a
model would demand allocation rules that require the incidence of taxation to follow eco-
nomic items in a manner discussed in Borden, supra note 10, at 344-45.
215. See supra text accompanying note 165.
216. The arrangement could have all the characteristics of an entity without affecting
this analysis. Therefore, the analysis assumes the arrangement is an entity that has in-
come and holds property.
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adopted allocation-dependent residual risk.217 Thus, although they do
not actually receive the allocated item, they should recognize it and
report it when the arrangement recognizes it. Aggregate-plus taxa-
tion requires the parties to recognize the amount allocated to them
on their respective tax returns. 21 Aggregate-plus taxation, therefore,
correctly addresses issues that arise in arrangements with allocation-
dependent residual risk.
Imposing an entity-level tax on an arrangement that adopts allo-
cation-dependent residual risk would generally result in inaccurate
placement of the burden of taxation. Adrian and Bakke formed a
partnership and agreed to allocate profits fifty-five percent to Adrian
and forty-five percent to Bakke.21 9 If Adrian and Bakke are subject to
different tax rates, an entity-level tax would have to accurately re-
flect their rates to properly place the burden of taxation. If the total
tax imposed at the entity level does not equal the aggregate tax that
the parties would pay under that regime, the entity tax would not be
accurate. 2 0 Furthermore, if the entity-level rate differed from either
individual's tax rate, the entity-level tax would inaccurately place the
burden of taxation.2 1 Even though entity taxation should not apply
to arrangements with allocation-dependent residual risk, the current
classification model allows such arrangements to elect to be tax cor-
porations.2 2 Thus, the current model facilitates the inaccurate
placement of the tax burden.
Integrating property and services not only makes tracing impossi-
ble, it also complicates tax accounting and reporting. Tax law must
address the formation, operation, and dissolution of integrated ar-
217. See supra Section III.B. (discussing allocation-dependent residual risk). This
clearly has allocation-dependent residual risk because the parties allocate specific items
(i.e., income and gain) to each other, and each has a residual claim in the property and ser-
vices of the arrangement. Thus, on liquidation, they would receive the amount they contri-
buted plus allocations minus any distributions.
218. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 703 (2006).
219. See supra text accompanying note 165.
220. For example, assume the arrangement had $100,000 of income and that Adrian's
tax rate on her share of income would have been thirty percent and Bakke's tax rate would
have been twenty percent on his share of income. Adrian's tax liability would have been
$16,500 ($55,000 x 30%), and Bakke's tax liability would have been $9,000 ($45,000 x
20%). To place the correct incidence of taxation on this amount of income at the entity lev-
el, the entity-level rate would have to equal 25.5 percent ($25,000 total tax divided
$100,000 total income). That rate would have to change each year that the arrangement
had a different amount of income or the tax rate of one of the members changed. Addition-
ally, for the incidence of the entity tax to place properly, the parties would have to allocate
the tax liability in such a way that Adrian bears $16,500 of the liability and Bakke bears
$9,000. The allocation ration of those amounts (65%:35%) differs from the agreed to alloca-
tion of profits (55%:45%).
221. For example, if Adrian's rate was thirty percent and the entity's rate was twenty per-
cent, the entity level tax would reduce the incidence of taxation for items allocated to Adrian.
222. See Treas. Reg. §301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006) (allowing multiple member
noncorporate arrangements to elect to be tax corporations).
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rangements. For example, a tax system that uses a form of aggregate
taxation for an arrangement's operations should consider how to allo-
cate built-in gain or loss that exists at the time of formation.223 Ag-
gregate-plus taxation can allocate such built-in items to the proper-
ty's contributor;224 an entity tax system cannot. To handle all tax as-
pects of integrated arrangements, tax law adds some entity compo-
nents to the aggregate system.225 For example, it requires tax part-
nerships to compute taxable income and recognizes that partners
own interests in the partnership, not the partnership's property.
2 26
Tax law would err, however, if it applied entity tax to integrated ar-
rangements that adopt allocation-dependent residual risk. Tax law
must recognize the parties' allocation arrangement, which makes
entity taxation untenable for arrangements with allocation-
dependent residual risk. Instead, aggregate-plus taxation should go-
vern arrangements with allocation-dependent residual risk.
Finally, an entity-level tax would provide opportunities for abuse.
For example, the current entity-level tax regime provides that prop-
erty contributors do not recognize gain on the contribution of proper-
ty upon formation of an arrangement. 2 7 The property contributors
take a basis in membership interests equal to the basis they had in
contributed property,2 8 and the entity takes the carryover basis of
the property.229 The nonrecognition and basis rules provide an oppor-
tunity to shift tax burdens. To illustrate the potential abuse, assume
both Adrian and Bakke contribute property to an arrangement sub-
ject to entity tax. Adrian has a built-in gain in her property and
Bakke has a built-in loss in his property. If the parties sold the prop-
erties before contribution, Adrian would have recognized gain, and
Bakke would have recognized loss. By contributing the properties to
the arrangements, they share the loss and gain. Thus, Bakke's built-
in loss offsets some, or all, of Adrian's built-in gain and provides a tax
223. Built-in gain is the excess of fair market value over the basis of property at the
date of contribution. Treas. Reg. §1.704-3(a)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2005). Because built-in
gain represents appreciation accrued prior to contribution, the person who contributes the
property should pay tax on such gain when it is recognized. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (2006) (re-
quiring the contributing partner to recognize built-in gain); Jacob Rabkin & Mark H. John-
son, The Partnership Under the Federal Tax Laws, 55 HARV. L. REV. 909, 915-20 (1942)
(discussing the tax issues that arise when a partner contributes property to a partnership
with built-in gain).
224. See I.R.C. §704(c) (2006).
225. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 703(a) (2006) (requiring partnerships to compute taxable
income); I.R.C. § 706 (2006) (providing rules for determining a partnership's taxable year);
I.R.C. § 707 (2006) (providing rules to account for transactions between partners and
partnerships); Borden, supra note 26, at 762-66 (describing the aggregate-plus theory of
partnership taxation).
226. See I.R.C. §§ 703(a), 741 (2006).
227. See I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006).
228. See I.R.C. § 358(a) (2006).
229. See I.R.C. § 362(a) (2006).
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benefit to Adrian. 230 The transaction shifts the burden of taxation of
Adrian's built-in gain to Bakke.
Aggregate-plus taxation also helps ensure the proper taxation of
changes in the value of property. Adrian and Bakke generally will
not know the value of partnership property and cannot allocate ap-
preciation on an annual basis. Thus, they will only allocate shares of
profit in a setting with imperfect information about changes in the
property's value. A partnership only allocates changes in the proper-
ty's value when the partnership disposes of the property. Under the
arrangement's allocation formula, the total gain or loss allocated to
each party in the year of disposition will be in the same ratio that
annual gain or loss would have been allocated in a setting with per-
fect information. Therefore, the difference between the allocations in
the two settings is a timing difference. Tax law recognizes those tim-
ing differences and provides different tax rates for gains on the dis-
positions of certain assets held for more than one year.231 Thus, ag-
gregate-plus taxation is well suited for arrangements with allocation-
dependent residual risk.
B. Case for Entity Taxation
Although entity taxation is not appropriate for arrangements with
either unitary or allocation-dependent residual risk, it should apply
to all arrangements with distribution-dependent residual risk. Ar-
rangements with distribution-dependent residual risk differ funda-
mentally from arrangements with either unitary residual risk or al-
location-dependent residual risk. Parties of arrangements with uni-
tary residual risk can trace economic items directly from property or
services.23 2 Members of arrangements with allocation-dependent re-
sidual risk can trace economic items from the arrangement's alloca-
tions.2 3 Members of arrangements that have distribution-dependent
residual risk generally cannot trace economic items from their
sources or from allocations because the members have integrated
their resources. 234 The following discussion demonstrates this con-
230. For example, if Adrian's property had a $50,000 built-in gain and Bakke's had a
$50,000 built-in loss, Bakke's built-in loss would offset Adrian's built-in gain. The result is
that instead of Adrian recognizing all $50,000 of the built-in gain she would have recog-
nized had she sold the property, she shifts half of that gain to Bakke. Adrian also obtains
$25,000 of loss that Bakke would have recognized had they not both contributed property
to the arrangement. Congress is aware of some of the potential abuses that entity taxation
provides. It has recently enacted a provision to limit the amount of built-in loss recognized
by entities in some situations. See I.R.C. § 362(d) (2006).
231. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2006). See generally Nel B. Cunningham & Deborah H.
Schenk, The Case For a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319 (1993) (presenting
some arguments for taxing gain from the sale of capital assets with favorable tax rates).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 206-209.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 213-230.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 212-213.
[Vol. 37:245
RESIDUAL-RISK CLASSIFICATION MODEL
cept. Thus, neither aggregate taxation nor aggregate-plus taxation
will provide accurate tax treatment for arrangements with distribu-
tion-dependent residual risk.
Distribution-dependent residual risk determines residual claims
by first computing the total residual value of an arrangement.
235 It
divides that residual value among the arrangement's members ac-
cording to a formula based on stock ownership or an agreement
among the members. 236 The distribution formula indiscriminately
combines all of the arrangement's economic items to compute resi-
dual value. The indiscriminate combining of all of the arrangement's
economic items cleanses the items of their unique identities and
groups them into a generic pool of residual assets. Thus, the profits
and appreciation in the example all become part of the residual as-
sets of the arrangement, and their independent attributes become ir-
relevant for economic purposes to Adrian and Bakke. That cleansing
makes tracing income from allocations impossible.
Recall that in one of the scenarios above, Adrian and Bakke
formed a corporation that granted Adrian preferred stock and both
Adrian and Bakke common stock.237 The corporation had profits and
the value of its property fluctuated over time.238 If the corporation
were to dissolve and liquidate, it would determine the residual value
of its assets and distribute the residual assets to Adrian and Bakke
according to their respective interests in the corporation. The resi-
dual assets would be a combination of contributed property, accumu-
lated profits, and the change in value of the property. The corpora-
tion would distribute the residual assets to Adrian and Bakke accord-
ing to the shares of stock they each owned. Adrian's and Bakke's use
of distribution-dependent residual risk indicates that they did not
wish to use specific economic items of the arrangement to reduce
agency costs. Instead, they used general distribution ordering to re-
duce agency costs. 239 In other words, they did not specifically use prof-
its or appreciation to control agency costs. Their interests were global
and included the overall performance of the arrangement. Tax law
should comprehend that distinction.
Aggregate and aggregate-plus taxation fail such arrangements.
Assume that tax law has perfect information about tax profits and
increases in property value. Assume further that tax law taxes prof-
its and gains at different rates and imposes limits on loss deduc-
235. See supra text accompanying note 172.
236. See id.
237. See supra text accompanying note 171.
238. See Table 1 of the Appendix.
239. See supra text following note 171 (discussing possible reasons why Adrian and
Bakke might use distribution-dependent residual risk).
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tions.2 40 That being the case, the amount of each item allocated to
Adrian and Bakke could affect each party's tax liability.241 By work-
ing backward from the computation of the corporation's residual val-
ue, the parties determine the total amount to allocate to Adrian and
Bakke.242 They cannot, however, determine the composition of the al-
locations. For example, they cannot determine the parties' respective
shares of profits and appreciation.
Consider the possible discrepancies that could result from apply-
ing aggregate-plus taxation to an arrangement with distribution-
dependant residual risk. The analysis will first examine such an ar-
rangement in a setting with perfect information. Then it will consider
the same arrangement in a setting without perfect information. As-
sume that in Year 3 the corporation has $102,000 of profits and a
$72,000 decrease in the value of the property.243 The sum of those
numbers equals a $30,000 increase in residual value for that year.
Aggregate-plus taxation would require the arrangement to allocate
profits and increases in the property's value to the members. Based
on the parties' distribution rights, the arrangement should allocate
$55,000 to Adrian and $25,000 to Bakke.244 The distribution formula
does not, however, determine how much profit and appreciation the
arrangement should allocate to the parties. Therein lies the trouble.
The arrangement must allocate $55,000 to Adrian using any poss-
ible combination of $102,000 of profits and $72,000 decrease in prop-
erty value. It could do this by using anywhere from $55,000 to
$102,000 of profits.245 At the low end of that range, the ratio of profit
allocation to Adrian and Bakke would be fifty-five to forty-seven (or
fairly close to one to one); at the high end of that range, the ratio
240. Tax law has different tax rates for long-term gains on disposition of capital assets.
See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2006). Tax law currently limits capital loss deductions to the amount of
capital gains plus an additional amount. See I.R.C. § 1211 (2006).
241. For example, if Bakke pays a lower rate of tax on profits and capital gain is taxed
at favorable rates, Adrian and Bakke could reduce their overall tax liability by allocating a
larger share of profit to Bakke in exchange for a larger share of gain allocated to Adrian.
Although Bakke may require some consideration to participate in such an allocation,
Adrian would be willing to make the allocation in exchange for consideration. See Borden,
supra note 10, at 322-23, 329-32 (describing such tax-item transactions).
242. For example, if Bakke's share of the residual value of the assets increases from
Year 2 to Year 3 by $51,000, the arrangement may assume that Bakke's share of the total
economic items for Year 3 was $51,000.
243. The discussion uses figures provided in Table 1 of the Appendix and rounds the
numbers to the nearest thousand for aesthetic purposes.
244. See Table 4 of the Appendix.
245. If the arrangement were to allocate only $55,000 of profits to Adrian, it would al-
locate the remaining $47,000 of profits and all $72,000 of the decrease in value to Bakke. If
it were to allocate all $102,000 of profits to Adrian, it would also allocate $47,000 of the de-
crease in value to Adrian and the remaining $25,000 of the decrease in value to Bakke.
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would be one to zero.246 Some amount of the property's decrease in
value would make up the difference between Adrian's total allocation
and Adrian's share of the profits.247 As Adrian's allocated share of the
profits slides along the range of possibilities, her share of decrease in
value would slide along its own range of possibilities from $0 to
$47,000. Thus, at the low end of that range, the ratio of increase in
value allocated to Adrian and Bakke would be zero to one; at the high
end of the range, the ratio would be forty-seven to twenty-five.248
That is a significant difference and could reflect significant tax con-
sequences for each party.
If the parties are in different tax brackets, the allocations could affect
the tax liability of either party, and the ratios in which the arrangement
allocates the tax items could affect the placement of the incidence of
taxation.249 Aggregate-plus taxation applied to arrangements with dis-
tribution-dependent residual risk would provide taxpayers the opportu-
nity to play games by allocating items to achieve the most favorable tax
results.250 For example, Adrian and Bakke may allocate more profits to
Adrian because Adrian is in a lower tax bracket.251
The lack of specific direction in the parties' agreement further re-
veals the inappropriateness of aggregate-plus taxation for arrange-
ments with distribution-dependent residual risk. Recall that the par-
ties' concern when forming the arrangement was not the allocation of
specific items but general interests in the overall performance of the
arrangement. 252 Tax law should recognize the parties' focus and place
the burden of taxation at the entity level. Entity-level tax will not
place the burden of taxation with perfect accuracy, but it should
place it more accurately than aggregate-plus taxation and help elim-
inate tax gamesmanship. Additionally, an entity-level tax will affect
246. At the low end of the range, the arrangement would allocate $51,000 of profits to
each of Adrian and Bakke. At the high end of the range, the arrangement would allocate
all profit to Adrian and none to Bakke.
247. For example, if Adrian's share of profits were $55,000, his share of the decrease in
value would have to be $0 to ensure that his total allocation came to $55,000.
248. If the arrangement allocates only $55,000 of profits to Adrian, it will allocate no de-
crease in value to Adrian. If it allocates all $102,000 of profits to Adrian, it will allocate $47,000
of decrease in value to Adrian and the remaining $25,000 of decrease in value to Bakke.
249. See supra note 241 (discussing the possible effect different ratios of allocation
could have on tax liability).
250. The current rules allow this to some extent, even in arrangements with allocation-
dependent residual risk. See Borden, supra note 10, at 338-44. The opportunities would be more
pronounced because the arrangement would have economic items to help satisfy the test for
economic effect. The only hurdle left to overcome would be the anemic test for substantiality.
251. The allocation would have to satisfy substantial economic effect, but that test is
confusing and the RS may have a difficult time challenging the allocations. See I.R.C. §
704(b)(2) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 2008) (defining substantial-
ity to include the present value of the after-tax consequences of a distribution, which may
be impossible to determine).
252. See supra text following note 171.
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the overall economic performance of the entity, recognizing the par-
ties' interest in the arrangement's overall performance.
The problems of using aggregate-plus taxation can be exacerbated
if an arrangement with distribution-dependent residual risk carries
property at historic cost. Such arrangements must make allocations
without taking into account changes in the property's value. With on-
ly profit to allocate, the amount of profit allocated to each of Adrian
and Bakke depends upon the distribution formula. In Year 3 for ex-
ample, the amount of profit allocated to Adrian would be $91,000,
and the amount allocated to Bakke would be $11,000 (a ratio of
roughly ninety to ten).253 The amounts allocated fall within the range
of possible allocations made with perfect information, but they do not
consider the amount of gain or loss, which is needed to determine
residual claims.254
The lack of information could have a cumulative effect as the ar-
rangement allocates profits over the years with no notion of the prop-
erty's changing value. Over a number of years, an arrangement may
allocate a disproportionately large amount of profit to one of the par-
ties compared to what it would have allocated with perfect informa-
tion. Ultimately, gain or loss recognized on the property's disposition
should equalize the total allocations. For example, if the arrangement
had allocated a disproportionately large amount of profits to Adrian,
the arrangement would allocate less gain to Adrian upon disposition of
the property. Such equalizing allocation could, however, have a cha-
racter that differs from the allocations in prior years. Thus, long-term
capital gain may offset earlier allocations of profit that were taxed at
ordinary rates. Offsetting ordinary income with long-term capital gain
creates a character shift over the life of the arrangement if profits allo-
cated to Adrian are later offset with a smaller allocation of long-term
capital gain. Thus, Adrian would have paid tax at a higher rate over-
all. That difference reflects more than a timing difference that occurs
in both aggregate and aggregate-plus taxation.2 5 5
This analysis reveals that members of arrangements with distri-
bution-dependent residual risk cannot trace economic items from the
source to the owner of the source. The members are also unable to
trace economic items from allocations. Aggregate or aggregate-plus
taxation would inaccurately place the incidence of taxation in ar-
rangements with distribution-dependent residual risk. Not taxing
such arrangements would allow the members to defer taxation inde-
finitely.2 6 The inability to trace income from the source or from allo-
253. See Table 7 of the Appendix.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 240-248.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 249-252.
256. See Brooks, supra note 90, at 638-43.
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cations suggests that entity taxation should apply to arrangements
with distribution-dependent residual risk.
C. Classifying Arrangements Under the Residual-Risk Model
The analysis of arrangements with unitary residual risk, allocation-
dependent residual risk, and distribution-dependent residual risk pro-
vides a framework for recommending the residual-risk model for clas-
sifying business arrangements. The model retains the three basic
types of tax arrangements--disregarded arrangements, tax partner-
ships, and tax corporations-but divides them based on the type of re-
sidual risk. The new model eliminates qualified tax partnerships be-
cause they lack policy and theoretical support2 57 That leaves one im-
portant tax regime-entity-minus taxation-unassigned. Entity-minus
taxation currently applies to S corporations. 258 Entity-minus taxation
allows corporations with one class of stock and subject to certain stock
ownership restrictions to flow corporate income through to the share-
holders. 259 That flow-through helps simple arrangements avoid the
entity and double taxation that the current regime generally imposes
on tax corporations. 2 60 The residual-risk model retains entity-minus
taxation and applies it to electing simple closely-held arrangements (as
defined in subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code) 261 with alloca-
tion-distribution symmetry.
Consider the arrangements described above that have allocation-
distribution symmetry.26 2 The corporation issued eighty shares of
common stock to Adrian and the remaining twenty authorized shares
of common stock to Bakke. Upon liquidation, the corporation will dis-
tribute eighty percent of the residual assets to Adrian and the re-
maining twenty percent to Bakke. If Adrian and Bakke formed the
arrangement as a partnership and agreed to allocate all economic
items eighty percent to Adrian and twenty percent to Bakke, the re-
sult upon liquidation would be the same.263
257. The policy justification for qualified tax partnerships is extremely tenuous under
the current classification model See Borden, supra note 35, at 347-59 (describing the in-
adequacies of aggregate-plus taxation as applied to qualified tax partnerships). Qualified
tax partnerships are not supported under the residual-risk model, so this Article recom-
mends eliminating them.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
259. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (2006) (restricting stock ownership); I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2006)
(providing that S corporations are not subject to tax); I.R.C. § 1366(a) (2006) (requiring S
corporation shareholders to recognize their pro rata shares of S corporation tax items).
260. See Arthur B. Willis, Subchapter S: A Lure to Incorporate Proprietorships and
Partnerships, 6 UCLAL. REV. 505, 509-11 (1959) (describing the benefits of Subchapter S).
261. See I.R.C. § 1361(b) (2006) (defining small business corporations that are subject
to subchapter S).
262. See supra Section III.D.
263. Compare Table 5 with Table 6 of the Appendix.
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Entity-minus taxation is a good tax regime for arrangements with
allocation-distribution symmetry because it allows tax items to flow
through to the members but does not impose the complexities of ag-
gregate-plus taxation. 2s The trade off for the simplicity of entity-
minus taxation is that arrangements using entity-minus taxation
must remain simple. Aggregate-plus taxation recognizes the concept
of built-in gain or loss on the contribution of property and ensures
that the contributor retains the incidence of tax related to such built-
in item.265 Entity-minus taxation, in its simplicity, does not have sim-
ilar provisions. The entity-minus approach is, therefore, less accurate
than aggregate-plus taxation, but it trades accuracy for justified sim-
plicity. The restrictions on ownership limit the number of investors
who will join an entity-minus arrangement and limit the transfer of
ownership interests in such arrangements. 26 Those limits help re-
duce the occurrence and magnitude of built-in gain and loss. 267 Thus,
only simple arrangements with ownership restrictions should qualify
for entity-minus taxation.
The law should not, however, prohibit arrangements with alloca-
tion-distribution symmetry from using aggregate-plus taxation. Ag-
gregate-plus taxation is the most accurate entity tax regime because
it accounts for built-in gain and loss. 268 It also has more aggregate
components than entity-minus taxation; for instance, aggregate-plus
taxation recognizes the nature of the arrangement's assets and ad-
justs their bases on disposition of an interest in the arrangement.269
Because aggregate-plus taxation enhances accuracy, tax law should
not prohibit arrangements with allocation-distribution symmetry
from using it.
Figure 2 depicts the residual-risk model. The first dividing line be-
tween disregarded arrangements and tax partnerships is allocation-
264. See Borden, supra note 26, at 723 (describing the need for some of the complexi-
ties of aggregate-plus taxation).
265. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (2006).
266. For example, subchapter S generally limits stock ownership to no more than 75
U.S. resident individuals and allows the corporation to issue only one class of stock. See
I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (2006). Thus, many potential shareholders, such as trusts, partnerships,
and non-U.S. residents, will be unable to invest in such arrangements.
267. The restrictions also reduce the occurrence of reverse built-in gain and loss. Re-
verse built-in gain and loss arise when a new member joins an existing arrangement that
has assets with value that differs from their tax bases. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(6)(i) (as
amended in 2005). Tax law should allocate such reverse built-in gain or loss to the pre-
existing members of the arrangement, not to new members.
268. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (2006). It also accounts for reverse built-in gain or loss. See
Treas. Reg. §1.704-3(a)(6)(i) (as amended in 2005).
269. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 751(a) (2006) (providing that a distributee partner or seller of a
partnership interest must recognize ordinary income for proportionate shares of partner-
ship property that will generate ordinary income upon disposition or collection); I.R.C. §
754 (2006) (providing an election of adjustment to the basis of partnership property on dis-
tributions and sales of partnership interests).
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dependent residual risk. Arrangements with unitary residual risk
should be disregarded; arrangements with allocation-dependent resi-
dual risk should be tax partnerships. The second dividing line be-
tween tax partnerships and tax corporations is distribution-
dependent residual risk. Arrangements with allocation-dependent re-
sidual risk should be tax partnerships; arrangements with distribu-
tion-dependent residual risk should be tax corporations. Finally,
simple arrangements with allocation-distribution symmetry fall be-
tween tax partnerships and tax corporations.
The model also determines the appropriate tax regime to apply to
the respective arrangements.
(1) Aggregate taxation should apply to disregarded arrangements.
Such arrangements have unitary residual risk and can trace income
from its source to the owner of that source. Aggregate taxation there-
fore suits disregarded arrangements.
(2) Aggregate-plus taxation should apply to tax partnerships. Such
arrangements have allocation-dependent residual risk, and members
can trace their shares of the arrangement's income from the alloca-
tions. Aggregate-plus taxation therefore suits tax partnerships. Enti-
ty taxation should apply to tax corporations.
(3) Tax corporations, under the model, have distribution-
dependent residual risk, and the members cannot trace income from
its source or from allocations. Therefore, entity taxation is the only
available alternative.
(4) Finally, either aggregate-plus taxation or entity-minus taxa-
tion should apply to simple arrangements with allocation-
distribution symmetry. The members of such arrangements can allo-
cate items based on proportionate ownership. The arrangements are
simple enough that they should not be required to adopt aggregate-
plus taxation.
Figure 2
Residual-Risk Model for Classifying Business Arrangements
Allocation-Distribution
Symmetry
Disregarded Ar- s met
rangements Tax Partnerships Tax Corporations
Aggregate Aggregate-Plus Entity Minus Entity
Taxation Taxation Taxation Taxation
Allocation- Distribution-
Dependent Re- Dependent
sidual Risk Residual
Risk
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the classification of business arrange-
ments should be grounded in economic principle. Unfortunately, the
current model for classifying tax entities disregards economics and
instead relies on legal forms, labels, and taxpayer elections. The cur-
rent model's unjustified reliance on such factors creates arbitrary
distinctions between the various tax entities. The current model also
ignores the policy reasons for the various entity tax regimes. As a
consequence, the classification model subjects some arrangements to
tax regimes that do not accurately place the tax burden. Taxpayer
elections also allow well-advised taxpayers to shift the burden of tax
to others.
This Article proposes a model for classifying tax entities that con-
siders the economic aspects of business arrangements. It also demon-
strates that economic theory helps explain why parties form business
arrangements and how they use economic arrangements to reduce
rent-seeking and agency costs. Tax law should recognize that use of
economic arrangements and ensure that tax items follow economic
items. The proposed model adopts residual risk as the preferred
measure of each party's economic situation and their shares of an ar-
rangement's economic performance.
This Article introduces three types of residual risk-unitary resi-
dual risk, allocation-dependent residual risk, and distribution-
dependent residual risk-that help explain the need for the various
tax regimes and suggest a natural classification model. In short,
members of arrangements with unitary residual risk can trace in-
come from its source and should be subject to aggregate taxation.
Members of arrangements with allocation-dependent residual risk
can only trace income from allocations, so such arrangements should
be subject to aggregate-plus taxation. Finally, arrangements with
distribution-dependent risk cannot trace income from its source or al-
locations. Consequently, such arrangements should be subject to ent-
ity taxation. Thus, this Article recommends the residual-risk model
for classifying business arrangements.
VI. APPENDIX OF TABLES
The tables in this Appendix summarize the performance of a hy-
pothetical company and illustrate how agreements and state law
affect parties' residual risk. They provide information that this Ar-
ticle uses to illustrate the importance of the residual-risk model.
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Table 1
Hypothetical Business
% Profit Accum'd Property % Value Propert Residual
Year Profit Increase Profits AeDrec. Increase Value Value
1,000,000
1 100,000 100,000 120,998 11.42% 1,120,998 1,220,998
2 99,712 -0.29% 199,712 80,634 6.95% 1,201,632 1,401,344
3 102,235 2.52% 301,947 (71,742) -6.16% 1,129,890 1,431,837
4 106,772 4.54% 408,719 (88,170) -8.12% 1,041,720 1,450,439
5 102,310 -4.46% 511,029 39,505 3.72% 1,081,225 1,592,254
6 98,030 -4.28% 609,059 25,334 2.32% 1,106,558 1,715,618
7 97,277 -0.75% 706,336 (41,315) -3.81% 1,065,243 1,771,579
8 99,657 2.38% 805,993 (90,007) -8.83% 975,236 1,781,229
9 98,858 -0.80% 904,851 41,184 4.14% 1,016,420 1,921,271
10 97,761 -1.10% 1,002,612 121,502 11.29% 1,137,922 2,140,534
Table 1 tracks the business's accumulated profits (Accum'd
Profits). Because the arrangement makes no distributions, profits
accumulate and become part of the business's residual value. Ta-
ble 1 also tracks the value of the contributed property. The resi-
dual value equals accumulated profits plus the property value for
each year.7 °
The model uses Box-Muller computation to create the log-
normal distribution. With a mean of three percent and a standard
deviation of six percent, the distribution skews slightly positive.
The following table illustrates the derivation of the random
changes in profit and property value.
Inputs for Random Number Generation
prfit % asset %
mean % 3%
standard deviation 6% 6%
Uniform Random Numbers Intermediate Box-Muller Computations Random Numbers to Use
randi rand2 r theta xl x2 profit % asset %
1 0.678657765 0.309233857 1.506817 1.942972 -0.547943 1.403657778 -0.29% 11.42%
2 0.197032669 0.269166747 0.662482 1.691223 -0.079588 0.657684016 2.52% 6.95%
3 0.697949816 0.776469396 1.54736 4.878697 0.256154 -1.52601096 4.54% -6.16%
270. The author thanks Thomas J. Brennan and Brent Fisher for help creating this model.
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Table 2
Partners' Residual Claims in Traditional Partnership
Profit/Loss Allocations
profit % appr %
A 55% 35%
B 45% 65%
100% 100%
A's % A's % A's Total B's % B's % B's total
Year Profit Aporec. Allocation Profit Apprec. Allocation A's RC B's RC
1 55,000 42.349 97,349 45,000 78,649 123,649 1,097,349 123,649
2 54,842 28,222 83,064 44,871 52,412 97,282 1,180,413 220,931
3 56,229 (25,110) 31,119 46,006 (46,633) (627) 1,211,532 220,304
4 58,724 (30,859) 27,865 48,047 (57,310) (9,263) 1,239,397 211,041
5 56,271 13,827 70,097 46,040 25,678 71,718 1,309,495 282,759
6 53,916 8,867 62,783 44,113 16,467 60,580 1,372,278 343,340
7 53,502 (14,460) 39,042 43,775 (26,855) 16,920 1,411,320 360,259
8 54,811 (31,502) 23,309 44,845 (58,504) (13,659) 1,434,629 346,600
9 54,372 14,414 68,786 44,486 26,770 71,256 1,503,415 417,856
10 53,769 42,526 96,294 43,993 78,976 122,969 1,599,709 540,825
Table 2 summarizes the performance of the arrangement as a
traditional partnership. Each party's total allocation is the sum of
the allocation of the percentage of profit (e.g., A's % Profit) and
property appreciation (e.g., A's Apprec.). In Year 1, Adrian's resi-
dual claim (A's RC) is the sum of his contribution plus the alloca-
tions of profit and appreciation. Each subsequent year, the par-
ties' residual claims adjust to reflect annual allocations. Bakke's
residual claim (B's RC) is computed in the same manner as
Adrian's, but because Bakke made no contribution, his residual
claim includes only his allocations of profits and appreciation.
RESIDUAL-RISK CLASSIFICATION MODEL
Table 3
Shareholders' Residual Claims
Stock Ownership
Common Pfd
A 50 1000
B 50 0
100 1000
Preferred Contribution: 1,000,000
Preferred Coupon: 8%
Pf'd Contr.
Year & Coupon RC Pf'd RC Cm'n A's RC B's RC
1 1,080,000 1,080,000 140,998 1,150,499 70,499
2 1,160,000 1,160,000 241,344 1,280,672 120,672
3 1,240,000 1,240,000 191,837 1,335,918 95,918
4 1,320,000 1,320,000 130,439 1,385,219 65,219
5 1,400,000 1,400,000 192,254 1,496,127 96,127
6 1,480,000 1,480,000 235,618 1,597,809 117,809
7 1,560,000 1,560,000 211,579 1,665,790 105,790
8 1,640,000 1,640,000 141,229 1,710,615 70,615
9 1,720,000 1,720,000 201,271 1,820,635 100,635
10 1,800,000 1,800,000 340,534 1,970,267 170,267
Table 3 identifies the sum of the contribution on preferred
stock and the preferred return (Pfd Contr. & Coupon). Each year
the amount increases by $80,000, or eight percent of the
$1,000,000 contribution. The next column identifies the residual
claim of the preferred stock (RC Pfd), which always equals the
sum of the preferred contribution and coupon. The next column
presents the residual claim of the common stock (RC Cm'n). That
amount is the excess of the corporation's residual value (see Table
1) over the residual claim of preferred shareholders. Because
Adrian holds all of the preferred and half of the common stock,
her residual claim (A's RC) is the sum of the residual claim of the
preferred stock and half of the residual claim of the common
stock. Bakke's residual claim (B's RC) is one-half of the amount of
residual claim of the common because Bakke holds half of the
common stock.
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Table 4
Partners' Residual Claim in Partnership with Target
Allocations
Distribution Preferences
Tier I Tier 2 Tier 3
A return contribution 50%
B 50%
100%
Tier 2 Contribution: 1,000,000
Tier 1 Return: 8%
Sum of Tier I & 2 A's B's
Year Tier I & 2 RC Tier 3 A's RC B's RC Allocation Allocation
1 1,080,000 1,080,000 140,998 1,150,499 70,499 150,499 70,499
2 1,160,000 1,160,000 241,344 1,280,672 120,672 130,173 50,173
3 1,240,000 1,240,000 191,837 1,335,918 95,918 55,246 (24,754)
4 1,320,000 1,320,000 130,439 1,385,219 65,219 49,301 (30,699)
5 1,400,000 1,400,000 192,254 1,496,127 96,127 110,908 30,908
6 1,480,000 1,480,000 235,618 1,597,809 117,809 101,682 21,682
7 1,560,000 1,560,000 211,579 1,665,790 105,790 67,981 (12,019)
8 1,640,000 1,640,000 141,229 1,710,615 70,615 44,825 (35,175)
9 1,720,000 1,720,000 201,271 1,820,635 100,635 110,021 30,021
10 1,800,000 1,800,000 340,534 1,970,267 170,267 149,631 69,631
Table 4 identifies the sum of the Tier One and Tier Two distri-
butions (Sum of Tier 1 & 2). That amount equals the residual
claim for the partner entitled to distributions under Tier One and
Tier Two (Tier 1 & 2 RC). The Tier Three amount is the amount
by which the residual value of the assets exceeds the residual
claim of the Tier One and Tier Two members. Adrian's residual
claim (A's RC) equals all of the Tier One and Tier Two amounts
and half of the Tier Three amount. Bakke's residual claim (B's
RC) equals half of the Tier Three amount. Adrian's allocation (A's
Allocation) equals her residual claim minus her contribution (Year
1) or her residual claim for the year minus her residual claim for
the prior year (all years after Year 1). Bakke's allocation (B's Allo-
cation) equals his residual claim for the year minus his residual
claim for the prior year.
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RESIDUAL-RISK CLASSIFICATION MODEL
Table 5
Shareholders' Residual Claims in a Corporation
with a Single Class of Stock
Stock Ownership
Common
A 80
B 20
100
Residual
Year Value
1 1,220,998
2 1,401,344
3 1,431,837
4 1,450,439
5 1,592,254
6 1,715,618
7 1,771,579
8 1,781,229
9 1,921,271
10 2,140,534
A's RC B's RC
976,798
1,121,075
1,145,469
1,160,351
1,273,803
1,372,494
1,417,263
1,424,983
1,537,017
1,712,427
244,200
280,269
286,367
290,088
318,451
343,124
354,316
356,246
384,254
428,107
The residual value of the corporation in Table 5 is from Table
1. Adrian's residual claim (A's RC) is eighty percent of the resi-
dual value; Bakke's residual claim is twenty percent of the
residual value.
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Table 6
Partners' Residual Claims in Partnership with Simple Allocations
Profit/Loss Allocations
profit % appr %
A 80% 80%
B 20% 20%
100% 100%
Ns % Ns0/ A's Total B's % B's%* B's Total
Year Profit Aorec. Alocation Profit Apprec Allocation A's RC B's RC
1 80,000 96,798 176,798 20,000 24,200 44,200 976,798 244,200
2 79,770 64,507 144,277 19,942 16,127 36,069 1,121,075 280,269
3 81,788 (57,394) 24,394 20,447 (14,348) 6,098 1,145,469 286,367
4 85,417 (70,536) 14,881 21,354 (17,634) 3,720 1,160,351 290,088
5 81,848 31,604 113,452 20,462 7,901 28.363 1,273,803 318,451
6 78,424 20,267 98,691 19,606 5,067 24,673 1,372,494 343,124
7 77,822 (33,052) 44,769 19,455 (8,263) 11,192 1,417,263 354,316
8 79,725 (72,005) 7,720 19,931 (18,001) 1,930 1,424,983 356,246
9 79,086 32,947 112,033 19,772 8,237 28,008 1,537,017 384,254
10 78,209 97,201 175,410 19,552 24,300 43,853 1,712,427 428,107
Adrian's share of profit (A's % of Profit) and share of apprecia-
tion (A's % Apprec.) are each eighty percent of the total of each
category. Adrian's total allocation (A's Total Allocation) is the sum
of her share of profit and appreciation. The same method deter-
mines Bakke's twenty percent allocation and total allocations. The
parties' residual claims include the parties' interest in the proper-
ty plus their allocations.
RESIDUAL-RISK CLASSIFICATION MODEL
Table 7
Partners' Residual Claim in Partnership with Target Allocations
with Imperfect Information
Distribution Preferences
Tier I Tier 2 Tier 3
A return contribution 50%
B 50%
100%
Tier 2 Contribution: 1,000,000
Tier I Return: 8%
Sum of Tier I & 2 As B's
Year Tier I & 2 RC Tier 3 As RC B's RC Allocation Allocation
1 1,080,000 1,080,000 20,000 1,090,000 10,000 90,000 10,000
2 1,160,000 1,160,000 39,712 1,179,856 19,856 89,856 9,856
3 1,240,000 1,240,000 61,947 1,270,974 30,974 91,117 11,117
4 1,320,000 1,320,000 88,719 1,364,359 44,359 93,386 13,386
5 1,400,000 1,400,000 111,029 1,455,515 55,515 91,155 11,155
6 1,480,000 1,480,000 129,059 1,544,530 64,530 89,015 9,015
7 1,560,000 1,560,000 146,336 1,633,168 73,168 88,638 8,638
8 1,640,000 1,640,000 165,993 1,722,996 82,996 89,828 9,828
9 1,720,000 1,720,000 184,851 1,812,425 92,425 89,429 9,429
10 1,800,000 1,800,000 340,534 1,970,267 170,267 157,842 77,842
Table 7 is identical to Table 4, except the Tier Three amount in
Table 7 is the amount by which the book value of the assets ex-
ceeds the residual claim of the Tier One and Tier Two members.
The parties' residual claims and allocations reflect the use of the
different amount.
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